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Abstract 
 
Under the new organic law (1995 OLPGLLG, Organic Law on Provincial 
government and local level government OLPGLLG) on provincial and local level 
government more powers were given to the district government in the hope of improving 
service delivery. However, years down the line and not much can be said about the impacts 
of the new organic law. Considering the poor state of most of the rural communities in the 
country the government’s aim of bringing more participation to the local level and more 
local oriented projects to be undertaken has not been realized in some districts. Although 
there has been so much increase in the grants to the provincial and district governments the 
outlook for most of the districts in PNG have remained unchanged. The problem is that the 
1995 reform was to address the rivalry between provincial and national politicians and not 
to enhance service delivery or curtail financial difficulties or corruption as put forward by 
the architects of the reform.1 These reasons were cited to justify the reform. The rivalry 
that emerged between the national and provincial politicians was a byproduct of the first 
organic law OLGP which was enacted in 1977 when PNG introduced its provincial 
government system. The secession threat posed by the Bougainville islanders forced the 
PNG government to introduce the provincial government system in a haste to keep 
Bougainville as part of PNG so as to keep the revenue from the Paguna Copper mine.  
The rivalry that came about between the National and Provincial politician is 
because of the Big man Culture PNG. Therefore under the current provincial government 
system the MPs exert too much influence on district budgetary affairs. The 1995 reform of 
the organic law placed so much power at the hands of the MPs, the creation of Budget 
priority committees’ and MPs discretionary grants have created a platform for MPs to be 
legally in charge of all the district’s finances. This study also established that the 
                                                          
1
 See Parliamentary debates  27
th
 June 1995 on the Organic Law on Provincial Government(1995) Reform 
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enhancement of service delivery to districts depends entirely upon the MP. This study 
argues that, the problem with the political process today is that the Big Man culture is 
embodied in PNGs political institutions which make it very different from other modern 
states, hence the very unique provincial government system. 
One of the main findings of this study is that under the current structure of the 
Provincial and local level government the LLG is incapacitated. Any decision on the LLG 
is taken at the district level and not at the LLG, LLGs by law do not have the power to 
make any administrative or budgetary decisions. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.1Background 
      The Pacific Island nation of Papua New Guinea (PNG) is one of the most fragmented 
and culturally complex country in the world. With a population of just over seven million, 
there are more than a thousand different cultural groups and over 850 different spoken 
languages. By steep mountains, sharp valleys and dense tropical forests, its people had 
been separated with each other as clusters of fragmented groups, clans, tribes and villages 
prior to colonization. There were no formal institutions beyond those natural communities 
and the traditional village assemblies were the most important, which involved all 
villagers and chaired by village elders (big men) or chiefs, to resolve disputes or to 
discuss issues of their importance2.That was basically how order was kept in the societies 
in Papua New Guinea until it was discovered by the Europeans. 
           Portuguese and Spanish navigators were considered to be the first Europeans to 
sight the island of New Guinea in the 16th century3 and it became colonized much later on, 
by which the island was politically divided into two parts, Papua and New Guinea. New 
Guinea, the northern half, had been under German control from 1884 until 1914, when 
Germany was defeated in the First World War. It then came under the administration of 
Australia who was mandated under an agreement of the League of Nations in 1919.4 The 
other half of the island was claimed by Britain as a protectorate in 1884, and was called 
British Papua5. The territories of Papua and New Guinea were unified in April 1942 when 
they became the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) which consists of 
                                                          
2
 See Jinks.B (1971), New Guinea Government: An Introduction, Sydney Angus and Robertson Publishers. 
3
 See http:/www.infoplease.com/country/papua-new-guinea.html 
4
 See Jinks. B(1971), New Guinea Government: An Introduction, Sydney Angus and Robertson Publishers 
5
 See Gelu, A (2008). The Quest for Good Governance: A survey of Literature on the Reform of 
Intergovernmental relations in Papua New Guinea. Port Moresby: The National Research Institute.  
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eighteen districts and seventy-nine sub districts. The structure of those districts and their 
boundaries were maintained right through the independence, and after independence they 
were renamed as Provinces.6 
             From such historical factors and geographical make up that more than half of the 
population still live in rural areas and are cut off from government services, 
decentralization is fit for Papua New Guinea.  Some districts like Marawaka in the Eastern 
Highlands Province or Karamui in Chimbu Province are not accessible by roads and very 
hard for the people to travel in and out. Therefore having a decentralized system of 
government not only makes the presence of the government felt, but also creates the 
opportunity for people to partake in decision making and ultimately having the government 
deliver services according to the needs of the local communities. 
             However, the founding fathers of PNG elected to the Constituent Assembly always 
opted for a unified PNG.  When, in order to go for the self-government in 1973, elections 
for the Constituent Assembly were held in 1972 and the first indigenous government based 
on the result of the elections was formed with Michael Somare as Chief Minister, his 
nation-building aim was to keep the country united after independence.7  
         Those founding fathers had to emphasize the unity of the nation even before 
independence, probably because they knew that there had been nothing like PNG nation 
being built and that, if any self-rule was to be granted by the trusteeship authority, any 
community, and not necessarily an artificial creation of PNG nation, might expect to be the 
subject of it. As a matter of fact, upon attaining self-government in 1973, those founding 
fathers had to face the threats of secession by various factions within the country. 
Particularly strong demand for secession was made by the Bougainvilleans. Since Somare 
                                                          
6
ibid. 
7
 See Delvin. M (2010). Decentralization without Disintegration: Provincial Government in Papua New 
Guinea, 1975-1985. Innovation for Successful Societies.pp.1-2. 
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and his government did not have any measures to contain this demand, they were forced to 
make a compromise by establishing Provincial Government system much sooner than they 
had intended. This set the path for decentralization in Papua New Guinea. According to 
Gelu (2008), “decentralization meant that leaders at the provincial level, and later 
community level, would make many decisions which affected them and their people”8.  
           Due to the nature and circumstances surrounding the introduction of 
decentralization in Papua New Guinea at that point in time, the powers and functions of the 
provincial government were embodied in an Organic Law and not in the Constitution 
itself. 9   Thus, the first Organic Law for decentralization, Organic Law on Provincial 
Government (OLPG), which was enacted in 1977, became the legal framework of 
provincial government in PNG. It was abolished and replaced by the Organic Law on 
Provincial and Local-level Government (OLPLLG) in 1995. Under the new Organic Law, 
legislative powers of the Provincial Government were reduced and the powers of the Local 
Level Governments below the provincial level were increased and stipulated with local 
MPs and District Administrators in control of the district and planning and budget. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
        When the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) made the Interim Report in 
September 1973 under the political crisis of Bougainville secessionism, they proposed that 
a decentralized system was suitable for PNG; firstly because the government was highly 
centralized under the Australian Administration and, according to the CPC report, majority 
of the people wanted a more participatory kind of government. They wanted to be involved 
                                                          
8
 See Gelu, A (2008). The Quest for Good Governance: A survey of Literature on the Reform of 
Intergovernmental relations in Papua New Guinea. Port Moresby: The National Research Institute. p. 7. 
9
 The decentralization process in Papua New Guinea was very much affected by Bougainville’s threat of 
secession. The provincial government system was introduced as a political compromise to appease 
Bougainvillians. Refer to Chapter 3 for more details. 
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and to participate in decision making that concerned them10.  Secondly, considering the 
fact that majority of the people at that time were located in rural areas away from major 
towns and cities11, by having a decentralized system, the CPC assumed there was hope also 
for more tangible government services to reach the rural populace.12  Hence, the provincial 
government was introduced by 1977 Organic Law.13   
However, as mentioned earlier, this 1977 OLPG was replaced by the Organic Law on 
Provincial Government and Local-Level Government (OLPGLLG) in 1995.  The new 
Organic Law, Filer (2004) argues, removed the power of the Provincial Governments to 
make laws about local government and increased the legislative powers of the Local-Level 
Governments themselves.  But they, in turn, had to place their plans and budgets under the 
control of the Member of Parliament representing each Open Electorate.14 
How can we understand the nature of the reform in Organic Law in 1995?  Did it 
strengthen or weaken the decentralization?  From the fact that the reform provided a legal 
foundation with the Local-level Governments below the provincial level, it looks to be 
promoting the decentralization.  However, if this legal foundation means the limitation and 
the steel framework in which Local-level Governments have to be satisfied, it may create 
more problems than it can resolve.  Peasah (1990) argued this point in the context of the 
oppositions of the people in the early 1970s against the local government councils that was 
created by the colonial administration: 
 
The difficulties encountered by the local government councils and the widespread 
emergence of these unofficial “village” and “community” governments drove home 
                                                          
10See ‘Underlying Principles’ The Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report 1974. 
11
 Majority of the people still live in the rural areas.  
12
  See ‘Underlying Principles’ The Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report 1974. 
13
 See The Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Part VIA-Provincial Governments 
and Local-Level Governments. 
14
 See Filer, C (2004) 'Horses for Courses: Special Purpose authorities and local-level governance in Papua 
New Guinea', State Society and Governance in Melanesia, Discussion Paper 6 p2. 
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one very important, indelible political lesson; that is, given the great diversity of local 
conditions in the country, the pursuit of a uniform local government system which was 
supposed to be viable and equally applicable in every part of the country was a futile 
exercise.  Hence, a much more realistic policy seemed to be one which showed 
sufficient flexibility to take effective account of local differences and peculiarities.  
Further, it was obvious that government at the village level would lack the capacity for 
viable existence unless considerable assistance was forthcoming from the higher levels 
of government.15 
 
     Peasah discussed that the functions of the local-level governments are so diversified 
that they should not be fixed by the national law, and that the most appropriate place to 
frame and assist the local-level governments is the provincial government.  If this 
argument applies, the 1995 reform, which weakened the Provincial Government, cannot be 
understood as an instrument to promote decentralization at the local level. 
This dissertation argues that the reform in 1995 is to be understood in the context of 
the political process and in the political rivalries in particular between the politicians 
assembled at the National Parliament in Port Moresby and those in the provincial 
Assembly under the 1977 Organic Law.  Thus, with the national legislation to change the 
local government system, politicians at the center tried to strengthen their position vis-à-vis 
their rivals in the Provincial Assemblies.  Because of this intention of the politicians at the 
center, it will be argued that decentralization has not developed so much. 
          However, it is not to argue that politics of Papua New Guinea has been centralized 
since the reform.  Rather, it will be argued that, after the reform, politicians at the center 
are expected to work not only for the national politics but also for the local politics at the 
                                                          
15
 Joseph Feasah, Decentralisation and the Constitutional Status of Local-Level Government in Papua New 
Guinea, NRI Discussion Paper Number 60, The National Research Institute, Boroko, 1990, P.5. 
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district level.  The 1995 reform of the organic law placed so much power at the hands of 
the MPs and the creation of Budget Priority Committees and MPs discretionary grants 
have created a platform for MPs to be legally in charge of all the district’s finances. 
While the demand for decentralization came from the ‘village’ or ‘community’ level, 
the decentralization envisaged in the 1995 reform was not to address this demand as the 
politicians at the center do not have any capacity to look after such lower levels of the 
government.  This gap between the local demands and the demands and capacity of the 
politicians at the center has resulted in the tendency to fuel the clan based service delivery, 
which is a common feature of PNG politics.  MPs focus on bringing service to their own 
clan to secure their “base” votes or bringing services to areas where they have support.  We 
will also argue that this is related to the dominance of Big-Man culture and lack of political 
accountability in PNG politics. The structure of the Provincial and LLG itself allows for 
the Big-man culture to flourish. Consequently there is so much misappropriation of public 
funds; as a result the state of most of the districts in PNG has deteriorated16. 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
           This study is significant because it provides the analytical point of view necessary to 
understand PNG’s political development. Prior to colonization when PNG was made up of 
clusters of fragmented groups and completely unaware of the outside world, studies have 
shown we were able to organize ourselves and have order in our groups which resembled 
what Westerners would call a “political entity”, with Big-Men or chiefs as the head. 17 
However, western concept of politics is new and ever since it was introduced by the 
colonizers, has posed a big challenge for Papua New Guineans on how to integrate the 
Western concept of politics into our society which is still very much influenced by our 
                                                          
16
 See Ketan, J (2007), The Use and Abuse of Electoral Development Funds and their Impact on Electoral 
Politics and Governance in Papua New Guinea. CDI Political Papers on Political Governance, p15-19 
17
 See Jinks.B (1971), New Guinea Government: An Introduction, Sydney Angus and Robertson Publishers. 
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traditional culture and practices. Most of the discussions on the political processes, issues 
and problems in PNG are always attributed to “cultural” factors, and there are insufficient 
discussions on the institutions itself, hence political problems in PNG are not sufficiently 
explained.  
        One of the reasons why traditional culture is being cited as the main problem is 
because, some of the renowned authors on political problems in PNG such as Marie Reay 
and Andrew Strathern are actually anthropologists by training; hence more attention is 
given to social forces than political institutions.18 Another reason is that our way of life is 
still very much dictated by our culture and tradition and it is factual that our culture has 
overlapped and affected the modern political process; hence it is understandable that 
culture is associated with political problems in PNG. However, just saying culture is the 
problem is insufficient; PNG gained independence 43 years ago and has adapted modern 
political institutions, and why it is that culture still affects the modern political process in 
PNG. The significance of this study is that, it put forwards that, the problem with the 
political process today is that the cultures, specifically the Big-man culture is embodied in 
PNG’s political institutions which enable its continuity and also makes PNGs political 
culture very different from other modern states. By detailing in concrete terms how 'Big-
man culture' forced the reform of the Provincial Government system and how the Big-man 
culture is embodied in current system, this study introduces a different spectrum of 
analyzing the political process in PNG.  
         Furthermore, this dissertation also hopes to contribute to the few studies that analyses 
the various institutions in PNG. The only study so far that discusses in detail the 
Bougainville’s impact on the establishment of Provincial Government in PNG is Delvin’s 
                                                          
18
 Reilly B(2002) Continuity and Change in Papua New Guinea Elections 1964-1997.In.Anere.R 
&May.R.J(eds) Maintaining Democracy: The 1997 Elections in Papua New Guinea, Canberra and Port 
Moresby, University of Papua New Guinea and Australia National University Press,p.17. 
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(2010). Following the events on Bougainville and the mainland PNG in detail starting from 
1972 onwards, by highlighting the roles of key individuals such as Somare, Namaliu from 
the Government side and Momis and Hannet from the Bougainville side, he discusses how 
the Government handled the Bougainvillian’s threat for secession in the light of 
development of the Provincial Government System. In conclusion he argues that most of 
the problems of the Provincial Government System were due to “imprecise” legal 
framework. He stated: 
 
(L)oose wording (of the organic law) and an over-reliance on vague provisions for 
future adjustments in the future served its purpose in the 1970s when reaching a 
quick political compromise was the top priority, but was not able to address problems 
that arose later19. 
 
        He identified the problems as; the Premier Council losing relevance because they had 
no coercive authority and the rivalry between the national politicians and the provincial 
politicians.20 While agreeing that the rivalry between the national and provincial politicians 
was the main stumbling block of the provincial government system, this dissertation goes 
on further to illustrate why the rivalry became an issue. Delvin does not talk (in detail) 
about the 1995 reform which this study maintains is a direct consequence of the rivalry. 
This study discusses in detail about the history including the introduction of provincial 
government system, the 1995 reform and the impacts of the provincial and local 
government system. 
                                                          
19
 See Delvin, M 2010, “Decentralisation without Disintegration: Provincial Government in Papua New 
Guinea, 1972-1985”, Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University p.9. 
20
 Ibid, p10. 
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1.4 Objectives of the Study 
       The objectives of this study are to identify the factors that brought about the unique 
local government system in PNG and to find the beneficiaries and problems of PNG’s 
current local government system by focusing on the current Organic Law (OLPGLLG) and 
its stipulations. Furthermore, this dissertation will show the continuity of 'Big-man culture' 
in discussing the Provincial Government system in PNG. Since the powers and functions 
of the provincial governments are embodied in the organic law, the research of this 
dissertation focuses mainly on the stipulations and actual functions of the current Organic 
Law (1995 OLPGLLG).  By concentrating the budgetary power at the District level 
through the creation of the Joint District Budget Priority and Planning Committees, the 
Organic Law has only successfully placed so much power in the hands of the MPs. It is 
understandable that the OLPGLLG has placed so much power in the hands of MPs in the 
hope of enhancing service delivery at the local levels but instead it has created more 
problems.  
        This study also attempts to illustrate that District Service Improvement Program 
(DSIP) funds and the District Support Grants are not an obstacle to development rather it is 
due to the ineffective systems in place to safeguard the effective utilization of these grants. 
This dissertation will feature case study of two districts in the Eastern Highlands province, 
to show concrete examples of how district functions. Despite the lack of development in 
most of the districts, there are two districts which are experiencing so much development. 
They are the Wau-Bulolo district of Morobe Province and the Ungai-Bena district of the 
Eastern Highlands Province. Even though only two districts have shown progress under the 
current system, this in itself cannot go unnoticed, and it shows the current system can work 
but why is it not working for all districts. Based on this a comparative case study has been 
done on Ungai-Bena and Daulo districts both in the Eastern Highlands Province. Daulo 
 10 
 
district has been chosen because within Eastern Highlands it is said to be the worst district 
in terms of developmental outlook and organisation within the administration. By doing a 
comparative study this paper attempts to find out why one district is better off than the 
other since both are in the same province and under the same structure of government and 
organic law.  In doing so the impacts of the 1995 OLPGLLG can be analysed. 
1.5 Methodology 
        This study used qualitative methodology as the main method of research. 
Primary data includes government documents, interviews’ structured, unstructured and key 
individual interviews, this including interviews of district officials and council 
representatives of two selected districts within the Eastern Highlands Province of PNG. 
        For this case study interviews were conducted with LLG representatives of both 
Ungai-Bena and Daulo districts on two periods in 2013 and again in 2015-2016. 
Additionally the District Administrator of Ungai-Bena was interviewed along with some 
district staff of Daulo District. Daulo district has three LLGs, which are Watabaung LLG 
with six wards, Upper Asaro LLG with eight wards and Lower Asaro with nine wards, 
which is a total of twenty three wards. Twelve out of the twenty-three councilors were 
interviewed. Ungai-Bena District also has three LLGs, Ungai with six wards and Upper-
Bena with seven wards and Lower Bena with seven wards which is a total of twenty wards. 
Nine out of the twenty councilors were interviewed. Additionally one Council President 
was interviewed out of the three in Ungai-Bena District and two out of three Council 
Presidents of Daulo was interviewed. All interviews were conducted on a one to one basis 
on various locations in Daulo and Ungai-Bena Districts. Furthermore unstructured 
interviews were conducted randomly among members of the public in EHP in 2015-2016 
to gauge a general view on the impacts of the provincial government system. 
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       Secondary data includes the review of books, articles, journals, newspaper, website, 
and social network sites. Government documents of both the pre and post-independence 
era pertaining to the establishment of provincial government and its reform in 1995 were 
also extensively analyzed. 
1.6 Dissertation Structure 
           This dissertation is divided into seven parts, chapter one focuses on giving a 
background to the study, its objectives and expectations. Since most of the dissertation 
deals with historical events, government documents and past studies, it is paramount to 
review past literature and current literatures; hence chapter two is dedicated to reviewing 
literatures. Chapter two is divided into two parts, firstly the review focuses on 1995 
Reform and Decentralization as a theoretical framework, the second part of the review 
focuses on the 1995 Reform and PNG’s political culture. The third chapter is for a detailed 
discussion on secession attempts in Bougainville around the time of Independence in mid-
1970s, and it is an important chapter because it explains how decentralization eventually 
came to PNG including the different roles different stakeholders played. The major reform 
to the provincial government in 1995 is addressed in chapter four. Discussions are based 
around the Big-man culture that led to the rivalry between the national and provincial 
politicians, certain key individual and events that contributed to the abolishment of the 
OLPG (1977) and the introduction of the OLPGLLG (1995).  The changes to the 
provincial government system after the 1995 reform and the issues that come with that 
change are discussed in chapter five. Chapter five discusses about the power structure 
within the local government and highlights the dominant roles the MPs and the DA in the 
district and at the LLG level. Chapter six is an assessment of the impacts of the 1995 
OLPGLLG. A case study was done on two districts in the Eastern Highlands Province of 
PNG to give a concrete example of how the new system impacted at the district level. 
 12 
 
Finally this study is concluded in chapter seven.  
 13 
 
CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical Framework of the 1995 Reform 
           Although 1995 reform cannot be exactly understood as a change toward 
decentralization, it is true that another local government below the provincial level, and 
thus closer to the people, was created so that the argument in decentralization may be 
appropriate to set the theoretical frame. 
Decentralization is defined as the transfer of authority or responsibility from the central 
government to subnational levels.
21
. 
            Under the “principle of subsidiarity” subnational governments are said to be more 
responsive to local issues and a better positioned to respond to them.
22
 “Subsidiarity is the 
principle which states that matters ought to be handled by the lowest competent 
authority” 23 . Various countries especially developing countries have opted for a 
decentralized system of government to improve its governments effectiveness in 
responding to issues such as poverty, poor infrastructures or poor health services and so on. 
              The advocates of decentralization argue that it leads to a higher level of political 
participation, accountability and administrative and fiscal efficiency.24 
For example, according to the  UNDP, “decentralization could also be expected to 
contribute to key elements of good governance, such as increasing people's opportunities 
for participation in economic, social and political decisions; assisting in developing 
people's capacities; and enhancing government responsiveness, transparency and 
                                                          
21
 See Neven, I Background Paper on Decentralization .Institute Altera-Green World Research, 
 Olsen, H.B (2007).Decentralization and Local Governance Module 1: Definitions and Concepts, p.2-4. 
22
 See Saito. F (2008).Decentralization and Local Governance: Introduction and Overview. In Saito (ed) 
Foundations for Local Governance: Decentralisation in Comparative Perspective Heidurlberg: Pysica-Verlag 
p.2-6. 
23
 See Olsen, H.B (2007).Decentralization and Local Governance Module 1: Definitions and Concepts, p5. 
24
 See Falleti, T.G (2004) A Sequential Theory of Decentralization and its Effects on the Intergovernmental 
Balance of Power: Latin American Case in Comparative Perspective. The Hellen Kelogg Institute for 
International Studies, p1. 
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accountability…..”.25 In line with this Yimaz, Beris and Serarro-Berthet (2006) also stated 
that “decentralization offers significant opportunities to improve government 
accountability. It creates the possibility of exerting stronger pressures on government 
performance both from below (the demand side) and from above (the supply side). 
Decentralization reshapes power relations among the local residents, local governments, 
producers of local government services, and higher levels of government (including central 
government)”.26 Watt (2006) goes on further to say that the major advantage of local 
government is that it allows the local public goods and services it provides to be adjusted 
to suit the tastes and the preferences of local residents.
27
 The proponents of the 1995 
reform like the two Prime Ministers, Wingti and Chan made similar arguments as reason 
for further devolving of powers by creating the LLGs after the reform. 
               However, despite this the results are not always favorable.  Studies have shown 
that decentralization itself is not a guarantee for all that to materialize, and, in the context 
of developing countries, be counterproductive. 
              As Olsen points out, “decentralization of power and authority from central to local 
government is important for the empowerment of local people, but this in itself does not 
guarantee the emergence of enhanced local governance.
28
 
Furthermore, in a study conducted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the link between decentralization and poverty reduction cannot be 
established. The study pointed out that in countries with weak institutions and political 
conflicts, decentralization could worsen things, despite these findings, the study still 
                                                          
25
 See UNDP, Decentralized Governance Programme:  Strengthening Capacity for People-Centered 
Development,   Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau for Development Policy, 
September 1997, p. 4. 
26
 See Yilmaz, S, Beris. Y, Serrano-Berthet, R. (2008) Local Government Discretion and Accountability: A 
Diagnostic Framework for Local Governance. Social Development Working Papers, Local Governance and 
Accountability Series. Paper No.113, July p.1. 
27
 See Watt.A.P. (2006) Principles and Theories of Local Government. Institute of Economic Affairs. March 
p.8. 
28
 See Olsen, H.B (2007).Decentralization and Local Governance Module 1: Definitions and Concepts. 
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maintains that decentralization can actually be a powerful tool for reducing poverty, 
improving representation of the poor and better targeting of service delivery, if the central 
government is fulfilling its basic function.
29
 
           Furthermore the proposition that decentralization is suitable to govern culturally and 
ethnically and religiously heterogeneous societies such as those in Asia and Africa was 
proven wrong in some instances. As illustrated by Saito in his paper on decentralization in 
Uganda “decentralization may jeopardize equity among different localities. Resourceful 
areas may take advantage of opportunities created by decentralization while relatively poor 
areas cannot”.30 
          If a decentralized state is considered ideal to help reduce poverty in developing 
countries, why is it that studies such as the OECD’s have found no link between 
decentralization and poverty reduction? Is decentralization a failed concept? Several 
scholars have attempted to share light on this issue, for instance regarding the various 
problems faced in developing countries, studies have pointed out “that it is a reflection of 
flaws in design and implementation more than any inherent outcome of decentralization 
itself”.31 Litvak Ahmad and Bird went on further to explain that in developing countries 
where institutions, information and capacities are all weak, decentralization is a big 
challenge. 
32
 For example Saito (2001) who studied decentralization in Uganda argues that 
“decentralization in developing countries the increased efficiency and effectiveness of 
public resources may not be realized, since resources (capital, human and even social) 
                                                          
29
 See Jutting, J, Kauffman, C et al (2004) Decentralization and Poverty in Developing Countries: Exploring 
the Impact, Paris: OECD Development Centre, p.7. 
30
 See Saito.F (2001) Decentralization Theories revisited: Lessons from Uganda. Ryukoku RISS 
Bulletin.No.31 March, p.2. 
31
 See Litvak, Jennie, Juaid Ahmad and Bird.R (1998) Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries. 
World Bank, p.8. 
32
 Ibid, p.7. 
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available at local level in low-income countries are very limited.  These scarce resources 
are more effectively utilized when they are concentrated at the national level”.33 
         Hence, importance lies in the implementation process, relevant institutions and 
individuals concerned. As stated by Olsen “a strong society is an important prerequisite to 
any meaningful, vibrant democratic and decentralized governance system”.34 
2.2 1995 Reform and PNG Political Culture 
             It is a fact that there is paucity in literatures on political issues in PNG generally. 
The local government system in PNG also has received little attention by scholars despite 
various concerns and issues confronting this level of government. Papua New Guinea 
opted for a decentralized system of government shortly after gaining independence in 
1975. That decision was partly to counter secession threat from Bougainville and as put 
forward by the CPC, have a participatory kind of government which can respond 
effectively to local needs. However, even though the secession threat by Bougainvillians 
played a major role in the birth of decentralization in PNG, there are very few literatures 
available that talk about this link. This is because in 1988, thirteen years after PNG gained 
independence a civil war broke out between the PNG government and the Bougainville 
Republican Army or BRA as generally known by their acronym, which lasted for 10 years. 
The bulk of the literatures on Bougainville was published after the commencement of the 
civil war, hence naturally most of the literatures are focused on the events and issues in 
Bougainville, such as its history of discontent, establishment of the Panguna Mine and how 
that led to the civil war. 
            
           Other studies on the provincial and local system in government have recently 
                                                          
33
 See Saito.F (2001) Decentralization Theories revisited: Lessons from Uganda. Ryukoku RISS 
Bulletin.No.31 March., p.4-9. 
34
 See Olsen, H.B (2007).Decentralization and Local Governance Module 1: Definitions and Concepts. 
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emerged, such as Matbob (2006) 35 who argues that despite its short comings 
decentralization is good for PNG as opposed to centralization and should be strengthened. 
He argues that the current structure is promising because it involves the local level 
government unlike before and planning for development is done from the local level36. 
However, he acknowledges that implementation is a challenge and that the provincial and 
local government system needs time to improve. 
             However, authors lack to point out that the new provincial and local level 
government system after the 1995 reform is rather unique. The uniqueness in 1995 Reform 
in PNG’s local government system seems to have close relations with its traditional 
culture, ‘Big Man Culture’ as some researchers like Rynwiech (2000) or Reilly (2008) 
suggest its strong impacts on PNG politics. 
         Rynwiech (2000) in his paper titled Big-man Politics: Strong Leadership in a Weak 
State argues that “politics in PNG is couched in terms, expectations and processes that 
reflect traditional “Big-man” politics. According to Rynwiech, this concept has been 
carried over to modern day PNG in which politicians are now the “Big-man” trying to 
access the nation’s resources to bring to their people in exchange for their votes (loyalty).37 
Rynwiech goes on to discuss how that impacts upon governance in PNG, mainly on the 
election process, in which there is lack of continuity of the political system because 
everyone wants their own Big-man in parliament there is high turn over rates of MPs 
elected every election.38 
            Another example is the fluid party system PNG has in which voters identify with 
individuals and not party. Gelu (2000) points out that “the real problem in modern PNG 
                                                          
35
 See Matbob, P (2006) The Challenges of the Provincial Government System in Papua New Guinea: The 
need for Strengthening Decentralization, Contemporary PNG Studies; Divine Word University Journal Vol 
4/May, p.1. 
36
 Ibid, p.7. 
37
 See Rynkiewich, M (200) Big-man Politics: Strong Leadership in a Weak State. In Rynkiewich, M.A 
&Seib, R (eds) Politics in Papua New Guinea: Continuities, Changes and Challenges. Goroka. 
Melanesian Institute, p.25-34 
38
 Ibid. 
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politics is how to balance two distinctively different political cultures that seem so 
incompatible.”39   He identified the two political cultures as PNGs traditional political 
culture prior to colonization and the Western political culture introduced by the colonizers. 
According to Gelu, the colonizers enforced their ideas, with little regard to understanding 
traditional structures which embodies ideas, values and beliefs, and instead they displaced 
the old culture.40 In PNG educating people was not a priority for the colonizers, therefore 
people did not understand politics in the Western sense, and real progress in instituting 
democratic practices and institutions started only in the 1960s. As a result of the conflict 
between the two political cultures, PNG has developed a hybrid democratic process, 
especially concerning election and leadership that follow a home-grown political 
culture…41 Gelu goes on further to discuss how PNG’s “hybrid” political culture impacts 
upon political processes in PNG and argues that a non-liberal democratic culture is 
emerging in PNG.42 Reilly (1999) also argues that “traditional forms of social organization 
still play an important role in PNG society and continue to be a significant influence upon 
the conduct of modern representative politics”.43  Consequently, politicians in trying to 
fulfill their Big-man expectations do not necessarily abide by the “rules”. As illustrated by 
Rynwiech, “there is lack of transparency and accountability in PNG politics as there is 
little concern how the Big-man MP brings resources home, only that he do so”.44 This has 
posed a lot of problems for PNG. For example, as this dissertation argues, decentralization 
in PNG has not achieved its aim of enhancing service delivery to the rural areas due to the 
highly politicized local government system PNG has.  Developmental funds are 
                                                          
39
 See Gelu, A (2000) The Emergence of a Non-Liberal Democratic Culture in Papua New Guinea. In: 
Rynkiewich, M.A & Seib, R (eds) Politics in Papua New Guinea: Continuities, Changes and Challenges. 
Goroka. Melanesian Institute, p.91. 
40
 Ibid,p.90 
41
 Ibid,p.91 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Reilly, B (1999) Party Politics in Papua New Guinea.  Pacific Affairs , Vol.72.No.2,p.226 
44
 See Rynkiewich, M (2000) Big-man Politics: Strong Leadership in a Weak State. In Rynkiewich, M.A 
&Seib, R (eds) Politics in Papua New Guinea: Continuities, Changes and Challenges. Goroka. 
Melanesian Institute, p.35. 
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misappropriated and service delivery is clan based because MPs are trying to fulfil their 
Big- man expectations. 
       However, as Stella (2003) and Reilly (2002) also suggest, the impact of the traditional 
culture should not be overestimated as determinant, but rather considered to be the factors 
to contribute to the formation of unique local political institution 
         Stella (2003) argues “proposition that traditional culture is inhibiting and deleterious 
to development is not only parochial but lacks depth. This view is derived from a common 
fallacy, which conceives of traditional culture as static. However, traditional culture is not 
static.”45 According to Stella culture and modernity play complementary roles.46 
Reilly (2002) argues that; 
 
(T)he comparative lack of attention to the impacts of modern political 
institutions has, however, also hampered a comprehensive understanding of 
the political process in PNG, and has led to a tendency to ascribe the causes 
of political activity overwhelmingly to traditional “cultural” factors.47 
 
              This study finds something lacking in the previous studies in the sense that the 
authors did not discuss the issue of culture affecting the political process squarely. For 
instance Rynweich talks about the Big-men (Politicians) bringing state resources to their 
people, but how are they able to do that? And Gelu talks about Fluid Party system because 
                                                          
45
 See Stella, R (2003) Papua New Guinea in the New Millennium: Some Troubled Homecoming. In: 
Kavanamur, D, Yala, C and Clement, Q (eds.) Building a Nation in Papua New Guinea, Canberra, Australia: 
Pandanus Books.p.14-15. 
46
 Ibid.p.14. 
47
 See Reilly B(2002) Continuity and Change in Papua New Guinea Elections 1964-1997.In.Anere.R 
&May.R.J(eds) Maintaining Democracy: The 1997 Elections in Papua New Guinea, Canberra and Port 
Moresby, University of Papua New Guinea and Australia National University Press.p17. 
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voters identify with the person and not the party, but why do voters identify with the 
person?  What is lacking in those previous studies is that no one mentioned how the 
continuity of Big Men culture is made possible in contemporary PNG. Under modern 
political system which was introduced to PNG, how Big-man culture still continued to 
have that effect. This study answers this question by arguing and illustrating the Big-man 
culture is able to continue because it is embodied in the modern political institutions PNG 
have in place, which also makes PNG’s political system different from other modern states. 
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CHAPTER 3: Bougainvillean Secessionism and Decentralization in Papua New 
Guinea 
 
         Decentralization in Papua New Guinea cannot be discussed without talking about the 
secessionist movement in the island of Bougainville and the issues surrounding the island 
at that time. Bougainvilleans’ actions in the lead up to independence influenced the 
Constituent Assembly and the Constitutional Planning Committee to set a course toward 
decentralization in Papua New Guinean independence. 
      Bougainville (island) is located 800km off the mainland PNG. In 1899 German and 
Britain divided the North Solomon between them. Bougainville became part of German 
New Guinea to the North while Short lands, Choiseul and Isobel islands became part of the 
British protectorate of Solomon Islands to the south.48 After German defeat in the First 
World War, Bougainville became part of the Mandated Territory of New Guinea under the 
Australian Administration. As Leo Hannet, an ideologue of the Bougainville secessionist 
movement argues, “Ever since white men intruded into our island….Bougainville has 
always been the victim of mad imperial music chairs”.49 
  
                                                          
48
 See Bennet, AJ (2000), “Across the Bougainville Strait: Commercial Interests and Colonial Rivalry”, The 
Journal of Pacific History, Vol.35, No.1 p.70. See also Laracy, H (1991), “Bougainville Secessionism”, 
Journal de la Societe des Oceanistes, p.53 available online at http://www.persee.fr/doc/jso_0300-
953x_1991_num_92_1_2896. 
49
 Leo Hannet, ‘The case for Bougainville Secession,’ Meanjin Quarterly, Spring 1975, p.286 as quoted in 
Premdas.R.R ‘Secessionist Politics in Papua New Guinea,’ Pacific Affairs Vol.50 No.1, 1977, University of 
British Colombia, p.67. 
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Figure 1 Historical Map of Papua New Guinea50 
 
 
A Pacific historian finds the reasons of Bougainvilleans to have strong secessionist 
sentiments in geography, color and religion. 
 
Bougainville is far distant from the larger and more populous parts of the country. 
Geographically it belongs to the Solomons group, from which it was politically 
separated in 1899. Moreover, its people have no significant traditional links with other 
parts of Papua New Guinea and may easily be distinguished from their copatriots by 
their skin color….Catholism, then linked and reinforced other elements of 
“Bougainvilleness”…Moreover, in the post-World War II decades the education given 
                                                          
50
 http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/base-maps/new-guinea-historical-control - Historical Map of 
Papua New Guinea. 
 
 23 
 
in Catholic schools and particularly at the High Schools operated by the Australian 
Marxists Brothers at Kieta, ensured that Bougainvillians generally had a higher level 
of literacy and broader span of learning than was common in the rest of Papua New 
Guinea. It also ensured that the local educated elite generally compared more than 
favorably with its counterpart in other districts. By 1970, therefore, Bougainville was 
on the way to possessing a substantial number of people, many of them closely 
acquitted with each other, who were well equipped to participate articulately and 
effectively in public affairs in their own district and also at national level.51 
 
      Although these sentiments were felt among the Bougainvillea’s, strong calls for 
secession did not come until after Convince Rio Tinto Australia Limited (CRA) got a 
license to prospect the Panguan and Kupei areas of Bougainville for copper in 1963.52 It 
occurred in the context of the 1960s when Australian Administrators felt that ‘economic 
development in Papua New Guinea was urgently needed to underpin approaching 
independence’.53 
3.1 History of Discontent in Bougainville (LAND ISSUES) 
       In January 1964 a CRA prospector was dispatched to Kieta (in Bougainville) and 
started prospecting the area. In 1965 he reported that a substantial mineral deposit existed 
in Central Bougainville54. Griffin observed that the “Australian Administration was obliged 
to promote its development vigorously but unimaginatively according to Australian mining 
                                                          
51
 See Laracy H 1991, “Bougainville Secessionism”, Journal de la Société des Océanistes, Annee 1991, 92-
93 pp. 53-54 available online at http://www.persee.fr/doc/jso_0300-953x_1991_num_92_1_2896. 
52
 See Premdas, RR 1977, Secessionist Politics in Papua New Guinea, Pacific Affairs Vol. 50, and No. 1 
University of British Columbia, p. 76. 
53
 See Nigel Cooper, “Bougainville Reconsidered: The Role of Moral Re-Armament in the Rorovana Land 
Crisis of 1969”, Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1991, p.57. 
54
 Griffin (2005) Movements towards Secession 1964-76. In Griffin and Reagan (Eds.) Bougainville before 
the Conflict: Pandanus Books, Australia National University, Canberra, p.291. 
 24 
 
principles.” 55 
          The Mining Ordinance 1928 declared all the precious or mineral resources under the 
surface of land belonged to the government. 
 
All gold, silver, copper, tin, antimony, and metals of every description, opals, gems, 
precious stones, and coal, shale and mineral oils on, in or under all lands … are and 
shall be deemed always to have been the property of the Administration, and shall 
be deemed not to have been parted with under any such alienation, dedication, or 
lease or license or permit of such lands.56 
 
               When any mining on lands never vested in the colonial administration was intended, the   
Ordinance required a notice to be given to the Warden and he should assess the likely 
amount of the damage to the surface of the land on behalf of the native land owners.57  
These rules enabled the colonial administration to give the mining right to CRA without 
any consultation with, or even any notice to, the native land owners.  Thus, “(t)here was 
opposition to the mining on the Bougainville from the very beginning.”58  The Australian 
Government records ‘Confrontations between villagers and geologists’ throughout the year 
of 1965.59 
    The Australian Administration in June 1966 introduced the Mining Bill of 1966 to the 
House of Assembly in order to enable land alienation necessary for the development of the 
mine that had not been provided for by the 1928 Mining Ordinance. 60  This bill also 
stipulated the compensation to the local people whose land was to be appropriated for the 
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 Ibid. 
56
 The Mining Ordinance 1928, Section. 191, (1). 
57
 Ibid. Section. 190, (1) and (2). 
58
 Joint Standing Committee, op.cit., p.18. 
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 Joint Standing Committee, op.cit., Appendix D: Outline History of the Bougainville.’1999, Cambella 
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 See Cooper.N(1991), ‘Bougainville Reconsidered: The Role of Moral Re-Armament in the Rorovana Land 
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mining. Local people would be given the rent of five percent of the unimproved value of 
the land but not any royalties from the sales of the products, as the government considered 
the minerals as government owned. 61  This denial of the right to the subsurface was 
contrary to traditional village practice62 
‘The local people felt that the legislation was rushed through the House of Assembly 
and were incensed that they had not been consulted,’63 argues Nigel Cooper, a worker with 
Moral Re-armament64 in Papua New Guinea from 1967 to 1970.  However, Australian 
Administration’s ‘policy since 1963 had been to handle all negotiations on their behalf on 
the grounds that the government was better able to protect their interests than the people 
themselves, and at the same time promote the national interest.’65  Thus a possibility that 
the national interest might stand against the local interest groomed. 
 
     In November 1966, Paul Lapun, a member of the House of Assembly representing 
Bougainville proposed a new mining bill by which 5% of royalties should be paid by the 
developers directly to the landowners. This bill was passed after his hard fighting against 
the administration and some elected members who had vigorously opposed this bill. He 
had tried to create a framework in which local would not feel exploited by CRA but 
welcome it. “But the seeds of discontent were growing”.66 
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            In August 1967, the Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Ordinance was 
passed in the House of Assembly, setting the course of copper mining project with CRA 
that might give a significant financial resource to the independent state of Papua New 
Guinea by paying taxes at 66 percent after 25 years.67 
          In 1968, CRA announced that there was an estimated 900 million tons of low-grade 
copper ore at Panguna. Soon after this announcement, a meeting of twenty-five 
Bougainvillians in Port Moresby on September 8, 1969 made a call for referendum in 
Bougainville to gauge people’s opinion about the island’s future. Leo Hannet became the 
spokesman of this group and eclipsed popular traditional leaders including Lapun.68 
       This call was ignored by the Administration but found many forms of responses in 
Bougainville, one of which was a creation of Mungkas that called for secession 
referendum.69  In March 1969, the administration announced it needs to acquire 40,000 
acres of land for the mining project in Arawa, Loloho and Rorovana. The Rorovana people 
objected vigorously. The administration threatened to take the land compulsorily if the 
local people did not sell it.70 
         In protest about 200 villagers attacked surveyors at work in Panguna, but this did not 
halt the CRA progress. They went ahead and announced on May 1969 that they will 
proceed with the copper mine.71 The local people’s grievances were tabled in the House of 
Assembly, but they were not content with that. On 6 July 1969 they formed an organization 
called Napidoke Navitu to coordinate the protest, which would become the focal point for 
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Bougainville’s call for secession in the 1970s.72 
What they were demanding for was the administration’s and the ‘white’ people’s 
respect for them, ‘all black.’  Raphael Bele, a Rorovana landowner and Treasurer of 
Napidoke Navitu insisted: 
 
To Bougainvilleans, land is like the skin on the back of your hand --- you can neither 
buy it nor sell it.  You inherit it, and it is your duty to pass it on to your children in as 
good a condition as, or better than, that in which you received it.  You would not 
expect us to sell our skin, would you?73 
 
          On July 28, 1969 the Rorovana people were told to accept the payment for land by 1 
August or it would be compulsory acquired. On 5 August 1969 there was a major 
confrontation between riot police and defenseless villagers. The local people’s grievances 
and treatment were widely publicized in Australia, and the company was publicly criticized 
and embarrassed. The company stated that it would increase payment for the land but the 
people were found not prepared for the company to take their land.74 At that point the 
administration was preparing for using force to end the matter.’75 ‘Both sides concluded 
that confrontation was inevitable.  
          However, the bloodshed was avoided as Lapun and Barry Middlemiss, an Australian 
plantation overseer in Nasioi, finally succeeded in persuading the people for the company’s 
use of land on the terms outlined in the Rorovana Agreement of 1969. Cooper attributed it 
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to the missionary movie propaganda and Paul Lapun's relentless efforts. The agreement 
stated that a royalty of 1.25% would be paid to the Administration, and 5% of this would 
go to the land owners.  The Administration also agreed not to acquire any further Rorovana 
land without the consent of the owners. 76   However, after the mining began, other 
problems arose and secession was back on the agenda. 
3.2 Call for Secession 
      After General elections in 1972, Michael Somare’s National Coalition came to power 
in PNG and inherited the strained relations with Bougainville. By then all four members 
representing Bougainville in the House of Assembly supported secession.77 
       Apart from the land issues of the late 1960s, Bougainvilleans were now also arguing 
that employment opportunities were too few, their royalties inadequate and the 
environmental damage and pollution from the mine unacceptable.78 They also resented the 
presence of PNG mainlanders taking jobs at the mine and held them responsible for a rise 
in crimes victimizing locals.79 
           There were also complaints that Papua New Guinea was taking large share of profits 
with only two percent returning to Bougainville and were also denying proper structural 
development.80 For these reasons there was a strong movement among the Bougainville 
Islanders that the profits of the mine should remain in the island and not distributed 
throughout the country.81 
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            In the words of Sir Julius Chan (Governor for New Ireland), who was finance 
minister at that time; 
 
They (Bougainville Islanders) felt very strongly that they need to somehow control the 
economy because of the Bougainville Copper mine that contributed almost about, you 
can say 90% of the total wealth of Papua New Guinea, or export earning of this 
country….82 
 
       The impending secession was seen by the newly formed indigenous government led 
by Michael Somare as a threat to the stability of what would be a newly formed country. 
Somare’s government could not have easily let that happen. Papua New Guinea has not 
gained independence yet, hence this was a delicate situation, if Bougainville Islanders 
succeeded to breakaway. It would question the capability of Papua New Guinea to remain 
as one after independence, with ever increasing possibility of other provinces opting to 
secede. In addition Panguna copper mine was an important source of revenue for the 
country, and losing it would be devastating for the rest of Papua New Guinea.83 Posed with 
this problem even before independence, Somare and his government were forced to 
quickly find a solution. 
      The Panguna mine was a strong bargaining chip for the Bougainvilleans, which 
influenced the government to adopt a policy of appeasement. Unless they permitted 
Bougainville a degree of autonomy there would be outright secession. 84  Initially the 
National Government tried to lure the Bougainville leaders in the House of Assembly to 
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their side by giving them senior posts85, but this tactic was not successful.86 The turning 
point came when an incident occurred in which two Bougainvillian men, both high ranking 
civil servants, who, Highlands (mainland) ran over and killed a child while driving. Locals 
retaliated and killed both of them. 87  The increased Bougainvillians hostility to the 
mainlanders united all Bougainvillians to call strongly for secession.88 
         In 1973, a Bougainville Special Political Committee (BSPC) was set up to negotiate 
with the government of Papua New Guinea. The BSPC proposed for a semi-autonomous 
provincial status to be granted and eventually full independence.89 The central government 
disregarded the proposal and a stalemate followed until 1 September 1975. 
3.3 Prior Rejection to Establishing Provincial Government System 
Around the same time this issue was going on, the government also had to prepare for the 
upcoming independence, such as drafting a new national constitution. Even before 
independence, Papua New Guinea was forced to deal with the issue of decentralization. 
        In an attempt to address these issues simultaneously the government established a 
Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) in June 1972. All the members of the House of 
Assembly, staff of the House of Assembly and visiting special consultants became the 
committee members. 90   They were tasked with drafting a constitution in time for 
independence. The terms of reference include matters such as; 
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• the system of government; executive; legislature and judiciary 
• central-regional-local government relations and district administration 
• relations with Australia 
• defense and external affairs-transitional provisions; 
• Public Service; 
• An Ombudsman; 
• Bill of Rights 
• Constitutional Review91 
As stated above, there were obviously a number of issues to be sorted out before 
independence and, the issue of decentralization was recognized as priority.92 
       Decentralization would anyway come about in Papua New Guinea even without 
Bougainville Islanders threat of secession. First of all it was more or less inevitable 
considering the geographical make-up and the diversity within the country in terms of 
culture and languages. Almost 85 percent of the main island of Papua New Guinea is 
covered with tropical rain forest. The central part consists of ridge of mountains known as 
the Highlands. It was so densely forested causing the locals to be isolated from each other 
for a very long time.93 Furthermore, Papua New Guinea societies are so fragmented, with 
over a thousand cultural groups and over 850 different spoken languages, it one of the most 
culturally complex country in the world. 
        To use the words of Joseph A. Peasah, a researcher who has published several papers 
on the Local Government System in Papua New Guinea (1994), “if decentralization was 
unknown anywhere else in the world, Papua New Guinea would have to invent it”.94 
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     However, it is possible that the observations made by the Constituent Planning 
Committee were prompted in part by the Bougainville issues as the Committee was formed 
after the threat of secession. The CPC was in fact formed partly to counter the secession 
threat.95 The fact that the Vice chairman of the committee who was responsible for drafting 
the constitution was Fr John Momis who is a representative of Bougainville Regional in 
the Constituent Assembly, also suggests the importance of the Bougainville Issue.96 
              If Bougainville did not provide the main impetus for decentralization, its role was 
nevertheless significant in the government’s decision to introduce Provincial Governments 
right after independence. The government made that decision in some haste because of its 
desire to retain Bougainville and maintain national unity at independence and because of 
the relentless pressure from Bougainvilleans. 
       With the time constraint and the issues that needed to be addressed before 
independence, the “readiness” of Papua New Guinea for establishing a decentralized 
system and even independence itself at that time could be questioned. This question is 
important in understanding the nature of provincial government in the current context. The 
problems faced today are a rippling effect of the rushed introduction of Provincial 
Government as a means to appease Bougainvilleans. 
        The Government was not prepared to introduce provincial government, let alone 
prepared for independence itself. 
As expressed by Sir Julius Chan; 
 
None of us really know exactly where we’re going and really, you know, the whole 
process of self-government to independence was very short. By any comparison to 
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any other nation on this planet, we were just caught up in the African race, that’s all it 
is. We had to do it in the shortest time available. 97 
 
He continued by saying; 
We didn’t have the economic structure in place. As soon as we said we’re going 
to self-government in ’73, we had nothing. We don’t even own our own currency, 
we don’t have a central bank, we don’t have any commercial banks. We haven’t 
got a clue about anything. So we were walking into the unknown all the time.98 
 
       Furthermore, looking at the constituent assembly debates in 1974, just prior to 
independence, pertaining to the establishment of Provincial Government, it was very clear 
that majority of the Constituent Assembly Members at that time were against the 
establishment of Provincial Government. Rather they proposed for Provincial Government 
to be established later on or more gradually. The excuse made by them was that Papua New 
Guinea was financially incapable of establishing Provincial Government right after 
independence.99For instance, Somare, Chief Minister at the time, argued that “there are 
many problems and obstacles associated with the question of provincial government and 
local government”100 He went on further to state that “we would not have the money to 
finance the establishment and function of provincial governments”.101  Somare argued for a 
stage by stage decentralization that is to allow only administrative decentralization and not 
political decentralization. 
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        His views were shared by the majority of the Constituent Assembly members who 
took part in the debate.  For instance, Tei Abel asks “Where can we find money to finance 
this new system of government and where can this kind of money come from? Provincial 
government just cannot be set up without money to finance its functions. On the other hand 
the unity of the nation is at stake.”102 Another member Angmai Bilas also agreed with 
Somare and said that “too many government cost too much money.”103 Of 18 members 
who participated in the debate pertaining to the establishment of Provincial Government, 
ten including Somare agreed that Provincial Government should take place gradually, and 
that it should not be included in the Constitution, and five argued that provincial 
government should be established in those districts (now provinces) which are ready to do 
so, and only three agreed for Provincial Government system to be established in all 
districts. 104  In July 1975, the National Constituent Assembly members voted for the 
Provincial Government System to be omitted from the Constitution.  
3.4   Why was the Provincial Government included back in the Constitution? 
       It was in July 1975 that the Constituent Assembly in their debate agreed to omit 
provisions of the establishment of the Provincial Government in the Constitution. This was 
the final outraged the Bougainvilleans. 105  They responded to this by declaring 
independence on September 1 1975, two weeks before Papua New Guinean`s 
independence.106 On 16th January 1976 the Government was given an ultimatum by the 
secessionist to either pay $2.5 million in royalty or there will be destruction. 107  The 
demand was ignored because it exceeded the $12.5 million allocated for each province. 
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Ten days later secessionist destroyed government property and tore up airstrips on 
Bougainville.108 Two Bougainville House of Assembly members resigned their posts.109 It 
is highly likely that Somare’s response to the riots had a big impact on the Bougainville 
Agreement signed later.  
       When the riot started, Somare’s reaction was quite calm. The Police in Bougainville 
were ordered by Somare to “act with extreme restraint”.110 Although he was pressured by 
the Constituent Assembly Members to take pivotal actions he did not concur. Instead he 
sent Mr. Namaliu, a former colleague of Hannett at the University, to negotiate with 
Bougainvillians. Namaliu negotiated directly with Hannet.111  
        While the riot continued, negotiations between the central government (Namaliu) and 
Bougainville (Hannet) was still going on. Finally in August Somare and Momis signed the 
Bougainville Agreement, establishing Bougainville as the North Solomons Province of 
Papua New Guinea and allowing it a much higher degree of autonomy than that envisaged 
by the Interim Provincial Government Act of 1975.112  “The Agreement reinstated the 
Provincial Government provisions through amendment to the constitution, and the passage 
of the Organic law on Provincial Government (OLPG).”113 
             This is first amendment to the Constitution. Section 187A provided for the 
establishment of a system of Provincial Government for PNG. Section 187C provided for 
an Organic law to make provision in respect of the constitution, powers and functions of a 
provincial government. (Constitutional Amendment No.1-Provincial Government) 
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        The Organic Law on Provincial Government (OLPG) of 1977 made provisions for all 
provinces to have legislatures and an executive. Provinces were also given full legislative 
power to make laws to maintain order within the province, but judicial power. The OLPG 
also provides for provincial administration staff, which consists of the members of the 
provincial secretariat and members of National Public Service. When it comes to Fiscal 
Matters, the OLPG provisions are that finances of the province will come from taxation, 
National Government grants, and proceeds of court fees, proceeds of certain borrowing, 
proceeds of investments and other moneys lawfully available to the province.114 
          The OLPG provisions for the inter-governmental relations were to establish the 
National Fiscal Commission, which consist of five members who have to be citizens of 
PNG. The functions of the commission includes reporting to the National Parliament and 
to provincial assembly concerned on any alleged discrimination in provincial taxation and 
make recommendations to the National Executive Council on the allocation of 
unconditional grants. A Premiers’ council was also established. They have to meet once a 
year to discuss matters regarding grants, loans, legislative powers of provinces and so on. 
The OLPG also provides for Provincial Government to be suspended by the National 
Parliament.115 
     The OLPG was the legal platform for establishing the Provincial Government. 
However, upon closer scrutiny some of the provisions provided in the Organic Law 
“contradict” the arguments put forward by the members of the constituent Assembly, when 
they were debating. 
    For example, Part IX of the organic law makes provisions for Provincial Staff. The 
provincial staffs are expected to be hired from within the province. However, in the 
Constitution Assembly debates pertaining to the establishment of provincial governments, 
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the argument put forward by a good number of members is that Provinces lack manpower. 
Mr. Somare stated that “The problem of shortage of staff will arise with the establishment 
of provincial governments. One province may have as many as seven agricultural officers 
but it will still lack officers for other fields such as business advisory officers and 
others.”116 
          Part X of the organic law makes provisions for Fiscal Matters117. The main argument 
why Provincial Government should be omitted from the constitution in the first place was 
the financial strain it will put on the country. After two years, how did the government 
come up with a solution for that to be included in the organic law? Peter Lus, member for 
Maprik, pointed118 out the imbalance in the ability of provinces to generate revenues. He 
stated that “I know pretty well that we do not have enough money in my district. You 
(Sinake Giregire a Member for Daulo) might have enough money because you produce a 
lot of coffee” 119 
           He went on further in his reply to a Member for Manus to state that “the 
representative for Manus stated that Manus was prepared for Provincial Government. That 
is good because the Manus people grow a lot of coconut and produce copra whereas in the 
Sepik we have no potential economic resource at all. 
In the same part of Division 3 there are provisions for “other Provincial revenue” including 
court fees and fines and other fees or charges etc. For provinces without resources, there is 
no revenue generating options for them, they have to rely heavily on the central 
government grants. This is still true today. 
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     These arguments illustrates that the situation of PNG was not changed in two years. 
Therefore we can conclude that it was the Bougainvillians influence that added the system 
of Provincial Government back into the Constitution. 
           In retrospect, the government of Papua New Guinea at that time did not have much 
choice. For the various reasons cited above, the only way to keep Bougainville as part of 
Papua New Guinea and keep the revenue from the copper mine was not to let secession 
take place. The Papua New Guinean government did what it thought was the best at that 
time to keep the country intact. When the provincial government was introduced in haste, 
the founding fathers did not foresee the rivalry that will emerge as a result of issue of 
having National and Provincial politicians. 
            The following chapter will discuss in detail about the rivalry, why it came about 
and how that has impacted the provisions of the new 1995 OLPGLLG, and how that has 
impacted upon the performance of the district governments. It will also discuss the 1995 
reform in detail and further explain the power players with in the provincial and LLG.  
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Chapter 4: Reform of the 1977 Organic Law on Provincial Government 
4.1 The Rivalry 
The introduction of provincial government came about in a difficult circumstance as 
illustrated in the previous chapter; hence it spawned controversy among the nation’s 
politicians.  Apart from financial issues of sustaining the provincial government, the 
provincial politician’s role within the province also became an issue among the national 
politicians.  National politicians here refer to the members of parliament representing the 
Open Electorates that correspond to districts120, while provincial politicians were those 
elected as voting members of the provincial assembly. The National Politicians and the 
Provincial politicians are voted simultaneously so that candidates have to decide to contest 
for either the MP seats or the Provincial Assembly seats.   
Under the 1977 OLPG, each of the provinces had its provincial legislature known as 
the Provincial Assembly (PA), whose elected voting members (MPA) have to be fifteen or 
more.  Together with three or more appointed members, MPAs would, from among 
themselves, vote for the Provincial Premier who would head the Provincial Government.  
MPs from the same Province (District MP) were also members of the Provincial 
Assembly and entitled to attend all the meetings of that provincial assembly, but has no 
voting rights, and should not be counted towards a quorum and should not hold any other 
office in that provincial legislature.
121
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Figure 2 Provincial Government Structure under the OLPG 
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      The Executive wing of the Provincial Government was the Provincial Executive 
Council (PEC) which consisted of the Provincial Premier as the Head, and other members 
(OM) provided for under the provincial constitution and two District MPs that are chosen 
by their colleagues within the province. All the District MPs within the Province were 
entitled to attend all the meetings of the PEC but had no voting rights and were not counted 
towards a quorum and held no offices in the PEC.122 Since OMs were to be appointed by 
the Provincial Premier, the latter actually commanded the majority in the Council and, 
thus, could control the provincial affairs that included the district finances. Very unique 
feature of this system was the involvement of MPs, i.e. national politicians, in the 
provincial and district politics. District MPs were allocated by the Central Government 
funds of their own districts’ development in the form of Electoral fund that were at the 
individual MP’s discretion. They were also entitled to attend all the PA meetings and PEC 
meetings that would decide the budget and other affairs for the provinces as well as 
districts. 
                                                          
122
 See the OLPG (1977) Part 5. 
Provincial  
Premier 
(District MPA) 
Provincial 
Premier 
OM OM 
OM OM 
MP 
Provincial Assembly 
District MP District MP District MP District MP 
Province 
rovincial 
remier 
Electoral 
Fund 
Electoral 
Fund 
Electoral 
Fund 
Electoral 
Fund Current Expenditure 
Open 
Electorate 
(District) 
 
Open 
Electorate 
(District) 
With voting right 
Without voting right 
MP 
District MPA  District MPA  District MPA  
Elections          Flows of Funds 
Open 
Electorate 
(District) 
Open 
Electorate 
(District) 
Provincial 
Executive 
Council 
 41 
 
          The District MPs seemed to get their presence at the provincial and district politics 
secured in the outlook. However, they did not have the voting right, and were not counted 
towards a quorum and could not hold office in the Provincial Legislature or Provincial 
Government123. Consequently, they did not have any influence over their districts through 
provincial channels, as they had virtually no power over the funds given to the provincial 
governments form the Center as they were automatic and had very little room to in the 
National Parliament. In other words, they were thoroughly excluded from the decision-
making except for the distribution of Electoral Fund which was at their discretion. 
        On the contrary each of the MPAs did not have individual decision-making or 
implementing powers over provincial or district affairs, but they could participate in the 
debate at the PA with voting power in deciding the budget and development projects for the 
province that would affect their own districts.  
    As far as the funds for managing and developing their districts were concerned, the size 
of the provincial budget was much larger than the Electoral Fund. Therefore, if those MPs 
had been in good terms with their Provincial Premier, they could be in a better positon to 
bring money to their supporters in district. 
       These ambiguous roles of the MPs and MPAs over their respective districts, together 
with strong independence of the Provincial Government and its power over the districts, 
put them and MPAs in rivalry, rather than cooperation, at their districts. While MPs had 
Electoral finds to distribute to their electorates, MPA participated in the Assembly Debates 
for allocating the provincial budget to their districts. As it is natural that the MPs were 
feeling threatened as the representing politicians of their districts by the MPAs who were 
also form the same district, as the latter might bring more to electorate, which could be the 
reason for the former to be replaced in the next election. 
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   These sentiments was displayed during the constituent assembly debates pertaining to the 
establishment of provincial government, and while some national politicians like Michael 
Somare, a member representing East Sepik said  “We just would not have the money to 
finance the establishment and function of provincial government”124, others like Ibne Kor, 
a member representing Nipa district in Southern Highlands Province, argued that the 
National Politicians should be the ones responsible for channeling funds to the districts. 
 
We, representatives of the Parliament are the ones who bring home to our 
districts our share of the pigs slaughtered in Parliament to be cut and distributed 
to our people. What I meant was the allocation of money from national 
budget…125 
 
Ibne Kor further stated that there were too many “problems associated with the present 
system of governance so the government should focus on fixing it instead of introducing 
another system. 126 
      However, as was discussed in the previous chapter, the provincial government system 
was introduced and powers decentralized. Then provincial politicians were in charge of 
Provincial affairs and National MP did not have a say in those Affairs. 
The Provincial Government took over the responsibility for delivering services to people, 
Matbob, a lecturer at the Divine Word University, stated that this “deprived the National 
politicians of an important base of legitimacy and in most cases contributed to a resentment 
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of and opposition to the very existence of provincial governments”127. 
       Why did these sentiments and rivalry come about between the two tiers of politicians 
on a normal political process? The answer lies in the deep connection PNG has with its 
tradition of “Big man” culture and how that still impacts upon the political processes in the 
country. 
4.1.1 ‘Big Man Culture’ as the Background of Rivalry 
      In PNG a Big-man is a highly influential individual in a clan and more recently in 
districts and provinces. Big-man statuses are determined depending on the followers each 
Big-man has. Big-man status is not inherited, it is achieved, and although being a son of a 
Big-man is an advantage over the rivals it is up to the son to prove himself among the 
people to achieve the status. His father’s status and character does not reflect upon him as 
he is judged by the people as a separate individual, whatever he does individually will earn 
him respect and loyalty. 
           Unlike other traditional societies in which leaderships are inherited and people are 
ruled and loyalty and respect is mandatory, PNGs traditional society does not reflect such 
societies. Influence and loyalty comes willingly from the people hence putting emphasis on 
the character of the Big-man himself, and his physical presence and his actions as an 
individual. 
      The Big-man has followers and he is the one that is responsible for protecting and 
assisting his followers and in return he receives support from them to elevate his status. 
Rynweich in his article, Big-man Politics: Strong Leadership in a Weak State explains the 
concept of Big-man and its transition from traditional Big-man to colonial era Big-man and 
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the contemporary era Big-man. While the outlook of Big-man changed over time the 
essential parts of the culture continues, as reflect in the contemporary era Big-man, this is 
vital in understanding PNG politics in its current context. 
       Traditional Big-man existed prior to any outside contact. Rynweich explains that: 
 
A (Traditional) Big-man- was a leader who wielded influence over his followers more 
than power. Big-man was not hereditary, Big-man status depends on his ability to 
influence and maintain support and loyalty from his followers. This is usually done 
through handing out of resources and interacting with his followers
128
. 
 
When PNG became colonized the actors, methods of the Big-man tradition changed. The 
actors changed or rather another dimension was added with the inclusion of Australian 
colonial administrators. The methods of gaining and maintaining support of followers also 
changed. 
              As stated by Rynweich, “Instead of warfare, developing relationship with   
Australian Administrative officers became a new road to bringing goods into the system in 
order to gain a competitive advantage over rival Big-man and their groups”.129 
Additionally: 
 
    Traditional Big-men were given a venue in which to make the transition to 
businessmen and politicians with the creation of local councils in which Big- man 
were appointed to positions such as councilors by the colonial officers.
130
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In the contemporary era Big-man are politicians. The traditional Big-man no longer exists. 
While this is true, current Big-man (politicians) still needs to think and act like the 
traditional Big-man to maintain their support base. This is because, the essence of Big-man 
in which loyalty and support depended on the ability of a person to access and distribute 
resources among his people, and his ability to interact with people on a personal basis and 
power and influence vested in the person himself putting importance on his physical form,  
never changed over the different periods. That continuity of Big-man culture is embodied 
in the political institutions PNG has and also reflected in the country’s political processes. 
     As a result of the Big-man culture, PNG political system is different from the Modern 
State political system. While modern states have established Patron-Client relationship and 
political parties to organize government and for electoral mobilization, PNG does not. First 
of all, the concept of Patron-Client relationship in PNG is different from other modern 
states; however, there are political parties. During elections some candidates contest under 
party banners, but when it comes to voting politicians, party and their policies do not have 
any relevance for the people. Parties become relevant when the government is being 
formed after elections. 
          In PNG all powers are embodied in the individual themselves, putting importance on 
the physical form of the politician not only that but also his ability to interact and “give” 
(handouts) to the people. It is common in PNG in which people will chose the “giver” over 
others. There is a saying that “gutpla taim, taim nogut em stap wantaim mipela” (He is 
with us in good times and bad times) and “em man gat han” which directly translates to 
“he is a man that has “hands” which is a figure of speech meaning he has and will continue 
to assist his people whenever there is a need for it. Assisting people is on a personal basis, 
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for instance if someone dies the MP or any intending candidates are there to assist in cash 
and kind, or if someone needs medical bills or school fees for their children, they approach 
the MP or intending candidates personally for assistance. If rejected or if the MPs 
especially do not interact and be with the people, they wait for elections to show their 
frustrations hence their loyalty shifts. If the MP is always in the city and is hardly seen in 
the districts the people will say “em blo Mosbi, mipela no lukim pes na han blo em, mipela 
lustintin lo em” (He is from Port Moresby, we have not seeing his face and “hands”, we 
have forgotten about him). Out of sight literally means out of mind. 
       That is why it is very important for PNG politicians to have a personnel interaction 
and connection with their people. Rallying of political support is done by the politician 
himself, because people vote depending on their interaction with the politician and how 
much they have benefitted from him. Therefore most candidates put emphasis on personnel 
interaction with people as a campaign strategy. Bernard Noibano, a candidate contesting 
the 2017 general elections for the Daulo seat, walked the length and breadth of Daulo 
district to interact personally with the people as his campaign strategy 131 , that same 
strategy is used by all the candidates almost everywhere. Even more famous politicians 
like Wingti who lost the 1997 elections, attributed his loss to not being physically present 
in his province to campaign. He said that: 
 
I put this [the loss] down to not having campaigned. I thought [the] Western Highlands 
people knew me for 20 years so I did not go out to the villages. I think that was the 
backlash because people did not see my face. That’s why the people have decided that 
a new Member should represent them.
132
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     The emphasis is put on the physical presence of the MPs, themselves, everything about 
that political position is embodied in the politician themselves 
       Therefore, physical presence and handing out of resources by the politician himself is 
very important to keep support.  For example, table 1 below displays the candidates who 
have won the Daulo Open seat form the 1972 general elections to the recently completed 
2017 general elections. Almost all of these candidates were local business men, most 
important thing to notice is that they all resided in the village and within the district(in the 
town). Daulo district is 20km out of the town, everybody comes to town at some point in 
the week so interaction between the MPs or intending candidates is the same as the ones 
living in the village. Since the town is very near the village the leaders can go to their 
village anytime. 
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Table 1:  Results of Daulo Open Electorate 
DAULO DISTRICT-EASTERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCE 
Election Years Winners(MPs) Background at the time of 
election 
1968-1972 Sinake Giregire Local Business man, lived in 
the village 
1972-1977 Sinake Giregire  
1977-1982 Gai Duwambane Policemen, lived in the 
village 
1982-1987 Gai Duwambane  
1987-1992 Gai Duwambane  
1992-1997 Sowa Gunia Local Businessman, lives in 
the village 
1997-2002 Ron Ganarafo Former CEO of CIC,lives in 
the district 
2002-2007 Ben Merere Local Businessman, Lives in 
the village 
2007-2012 NK Patrick Kondo Local Businessman ,lives in 
the village 
2012-2017 Ron Ganarafo Former CEO of CIC,lives in 
the district 
2017-Present Pogio Ghate Local Businessman, lives in 
the village 
 
 
     Furthermore, members of the public in Goroka town, Eastern Highlands Province were 
interviewed to gauge their views on the performance of their MP, district staff, the 
effectiveness of the JDPBPC and their thoughts and knowledge of the OLPGLLG. 
According to this interview when people were asked to give their opinions on their current 
MPs, 28% of the respondents said the MPs performance was good while 72% of the 
respondents stated that, the performance of the MPs in their districts where bad. 
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Figure 3
133
 Opinions on current MP’s performance in EHP 
Source: Author’s interviews in 2015-6. Total Number of Respondents: 156 
 
When asked why they stated that the MPs performance was bad 47% of those respondents 
said that there is no sign of the MP after the election. 
 
 
Figure 4 Opinions on why MPs performance is bad?
134
 
Source: Author’s interviews in 2015-6. Total Number of Respondents: 113. 
        This means that the MP is not seen in the districts as he is in the capital city, Port 
Moresby. The 32% that said that it was due to no service delivery also, mentioned that the 
MPs absence in the district resulted in lack of service delivery. Because the MP is not 
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physically present he, is already seen in a negative way, regardless of projects he may 
approve and achieve under his leadership, he will be assessed by his presence in the village 
and his interaction with the people. 
 
       MP’s relocating to Port Moresby after elections have become a trend in PNG, and this 
has led people to usually say “em bai go sindaun gut na kaikai wantaim meri, pikinini blo 
em na no inap tintin lo mipla” (He will go and live a comfortable life with his family and 
will forget us). These sentiments become stronger when the MP does not show face in the 
district and villages. When MPs are not present in the districts and villages, it creates a rift 
between the people and the MPs, that rift is usually filled by somebody who intends to 
compete in the next elections. People vote for down to earth, “mangi lo ples”(village based 
man) who lives amongst the people because they feel he is at their level and it is easy for 
them to interact with him when he becomes MP. 
    This has made elections in Daulo so predictable, for instance a Daulo resident135 who 
had his own nephew competing in the elections predicted that the nephew was not going to 
win because he was not a “people’s person and does not live in the village with the people, 
and he lives in the city”, he predicted Pogio Ghate or Henry Bagme to win, and he was 
correct as Pogio Ghate won and Henry Bagme finished third136. Pogio Ghate is a local 
businessman who lives in the villages, even before political interest and he was always 
assisting the people in his village and surrounding villages and has earned respect among 
the people. Therefore when he competed, it was only “natural” for him to have a chance at 
winning. 
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      For districts like Ungai-Bena and Wau-Bulolo, they have the same MP for the 4th 
consecutive terms now. The reason is because of their simplicity and the way they interact 
with the people. Both have ministerial portfolios and are busy at the national level but still 
make time to be present in their districts. Ungai-Bena MP Benny Allan when he is in the 
district is always in his office, and his people are allowed to go and see and talk to him 
about their issues. According to the district administrator and the councilors, whenever 
there is ceremony or anything in the villages he is always present 137 . When I was 
interviewing the Ungai-Bena district staff at their district office in Goroka, I saw the MP in 
his office, and people were taking turns to go and see him. For the Wau-Bulolo district 
their MP Sam Basil lives in his own house in the district. Wau-Bulolo is a remote district, 
but the MP lives there, takes part in project implementations and act like a regular guy in 
the village. This has earned both MPs so much respect amongst their people and within the 
country. 
4.1.2 Why do people favor the Big-Man Culture? 
       People favor the Big-Man Culture because they have the opportunity to access 
resource and benefit directly on a personal level. Furthermore, because the Big-Men are 
politicians, people’s chances of getting resources are higher, because politicians are 
compelled to hand out resources to secure votes. Consequently personnel relationship with 
the MP is important, hence most people tend to vote their own clans man and candidates 
whom they know personally. In return the MP gives more to his own people to secure his 
base vote. 
      The physical presence of the MP or intending candidates is so important that it has 
taken over the concept of loyalty to traditional tribes/clans. PNG in recent years have 
witnessed residents of foreign origin winning seats and becoming members of parliament, 
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indicating the break in traditional clan/tribe loyalty. These foreigners have been with the 
people and provided resources for the people and have earned respect from the people. 
People’s behavior in voting is no longer influenced by traditional clan/tribe relations but by 
the physical presence and material benefits one can receive. This created an avenue where 
long time residence of foreign origin could win elections. For example, the current 
Governor(MP)  West New Britain Province(WNB), Sasindran Muthuvel is of Indian origin 
and is serving his second consecutive term in office, Mal Smith “Kela” of Australian origin 
was the governor for Eastern Highlands Province (EHP) from 2007-2012. Other aspirants 
like Simon Sia of Malaysian origin who contested for the EHP seat did not win but polled 
very well all over the province138. 
        For as long as that person can access and distribute resources and is physically in the 
village and districts interacting with the people, he will have followers who in turn will 
vote him if he chose to contest the elections to become their MP in Parliament. 
       Due to this characteristic of politics in PNG and the dominance of the Big-man 
culture, the National MPs were unsettled about the organic law (OLPG) being introduced 
in 1977, and when it did they knew their political base was threatened. When the provincial 
government was established in 1977, the Provincial Premiers became the head of the 
province in charge of all the provincial affairs. They were responsible for the province’s 
budgetary issues, developmental issues and so forth. There was separation of powers in 
which national MPs do not have much say in district affairs.  Although the 1977 OLPG 
came about as a compromise between the Bougainville and the Big-men (MPs) of 
community, it was later found insufficient for the National Politicians to survive as Big 
men. For instance, pertaining to the provincial executives Part V: Structure of Provincial 
Governments, Section 17 Subsection 3A of   the 1977 OLPG states that, 
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“A member of the National Parliament is entitled to attend all meetings of the provincial 
executive but has no voting right, is not counted towards a quorum and shall not hold any 
office in the provincial executive.”139 
      Observer status in the Provincial Executive Council does not guarantee reelection of 
National Politicians, as that status doesn’t mean any power to provide actual goods and 
services to the community members. Thus they realize that they had to have real budgetary 
powers both in National level and Provincial level. 
    Similarly for the provincial legislatures, the MPs can attend but have no voting rights, 
are not counted towards a quorum and cannot hold any office140. MP’s also do not have a 
say in appointing Provincial Secretariats. Part V: Structure of Provincial Governments, 
Section 17 Subsection 3B of The OLPG states that: 
 
a provincial law will make provisions for and in relation to provincial secretariat, the 
national Government has no direction or control over a provincial secretariat or its 
members and provincial secretariat hold office on terms and conditions determined 
by the provincial government.141 
 
This did not sit well with the National Politicians as they are being left out in important 
authorities within the province and district. For instance as pointed out by Matbob, 
“disputes between the provincial and national politicians were created over matters such as 
the appointment of provincial secretaries, who are key links between public service and 
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provincial governments”142 This means that National Politicians cannot get access to the 
resource at the local level and instead, Provincial premiers are the ones accessing those 
resources and interacting with the local people and delivering service, hence gaining 
popularity with the locals. As stated by to Gelu: 
 
(T)he two groups of leaders do not compete for the same elected office, they actively 
compete for recognition as leaders of the same people”. With the existence of provincial 
politicians, national politicians saw a challenge to their political base.143 
 
     Therefore, the popularity of the provincial premiers posed grave concerns to the 
national MPs that they would become irrelevant and unnecessary in the eyes of their 
voters. According to Mukherjee, “Government projects in the province were more likely to 
be identified with provincial leaders even if national agencies pay the bills. Moreover, 
many provincial politicians harbored ambitions to compete for Parliament”.144 
    With the increase in popularity of the provincial government under the leadership of the 
premiers and the possibility that the national MP’s could be challenged for their seat, this 
became a concern to them. Hence, as Matbob pointed out that “strong support for the 
reform came from the backbenchers” 145. Back benches meaning the MPs who have no 
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ministerial portfolios and no Parliamentary offices. They were the more aggrieved ones as 
they felt incapacitated, without ministerial platforms, no parliamentary offices and not 
being in control of their district finances and affairs. 
           The challenge for PMs at that time was to keep support on the floor of Parliament to 
remain as PM and to maintain support from their constituency to be reelected. 
           On the floor of Parliament the PMs at that time had to concede to the demands of 
the back benchers for their own insecurities about losing to a vote of no confidence. 
According to the constitution of PNG, “a motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister or 
in the Ministry may not be moved during the period of eighteen months commencing on 
the date of the appointment of the Prime Minister”146 
       This means that the constitution allows for a motion of no confidence to take place 18 
months after a new government is formed. From 1975(Independence) to 1995 (year of the 
reform) there has been seven different governments, that’s seven different governments in 
20 years, meaning each government served an average of 2 years. 
      Hence PNG was plagued with instability at the national level with successive 
government since independence not completing their full term. Although reasons of good 
governance, stability and effective service delivery were put forward as the main impetus 
for the reform, this study maintains that the rivalry was the main driving force behind the 
reform. For example, Kia Beckson, the former premier of Eastern Highlands Province 
under the OLPG (1977), when asked to give his views about why the reform took place, 
reaffirmed the rivalry as a major cause of the reform. He said, “money and power politics 
caused the reform, it has nothing to do with enhancing service delivery to the people, in 
fact we were doing a good job back then compared to now.”147 As will be illustrated later 
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on the players involved in the reform also reflects the rivalry within the two tiers of 
government caused by the Big-man culture. 
4.2 The Reform 
          As a result of the rivalry many provincial governments were suspended by the 
National Executive Council (NEC) which eventually led to the abolishment of the OLPG 
in 1995.  Section 187E of the OLPG provides for the suspension of provincial and local 
governments. According to May, after the provincial government was established until the 
reform in 1995 “all but five of the nineteen provinces were suspended on the grounds of 
financial mismanagement.”148 These high numbers of suspensions also reflect the rivalry 
between the national and provincial politicians. The process of the reform took place under 
two different Prime Ministers, Pias Wingti and Julius Chan. The turning point came in 
1992 when Pias Wingti ascended to Prime Minister, with Julius Chan as his deputy. Wingti 
raised the issue of reform again, this time with serious incentive by him and his 
government; it took root and became a serious issue. Unfortunately Wingti was not able to 
see the reform through as he was ousted from Prime Minister in 1994. His deputy Chan 
took over and made sure the reform happened in 1995. 
4.2.1 Reform under Wingti 
     Wingti was a young new MP who won the Hagen Open seat while doing his final year 
majoring in Economics at the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG). Wingti was a 
member of the UPNG Student Representative Council 149 . Wingti’s popularity can be 
attributed to the fact that he was very young and represented an emergence of a new kind 
of leadership trait. 
                                                          
148
 May R.J (2013) Policy Making on Decentralization:  Policy Making and Implementation: Studies from 
Papua New Guinea:  Australia National University, Canberra, p.5. 
149
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paias_Wingti. 
 57 
 
     He was the Member of Parliament for Hagen Open (Western Highlands province), and 
was the leader of the Highlands based Peoples Democratic Movement Party (PDM). 
Regardless of his unpopularity, he was prime minister from 1985-87 and again from 1992-
94. However, he lost his position as a PM to a vote of no confidence in 1987150and was 
ousted by the Supreme Court as PM in 1994. Wingti secretly resigned during a special 
parliamentary session on September 23rd 1993 (to avoid a vote of no confidence) and was 
reelected the next morning. The Opposition challenged him before the Supreme Court and 
on 25th August 1994 his reelection was found to be unconstitutional and was rendered null 
and void. Hence the Parliament has to proceed immediately to elect a new PM, Wingti was 
unseated and Chan succeeded him as PM.151 
 
     Prior to becoming Prime Minister, he became deputy prime minister in 1982. The 
Australian scholar May (2004) pointed out that “Wingti’s rise to deputy PM in 1982 was 
purely intra-party decision (Pangu Party)152 to give that position to a Highlander to balance 
the geographical distribution of top political offices in the state to safe guard Pangu's 
impressive showing in the Highlands during the 1982 elections”153. 
       Saffu (1987) also maintains that, “Wingti's rapid transition to the prime minister's 
office was similarly the result of a favorable conjunction of circumstances, rather than his 
possession of a powerful political base.”154 Pias Wingti came to power when the political 
situation in PNG after independence was volatile and very unstable, mainly due to the civil 
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war in Bougainville which broke out in 1989155 and the constant vote of no confidence 
motions, which saw Prime Ministers hardly completing their terms in office, consequently 
resulting in policy change and defections from opposition to government and vice versa.     
When Somare lost a parliamentary vote of no confidence in 1985, he was succeeded by 
Pias Wingti. Wingti’s term was rather short (2 years) and he was replaced by another vote 
of no confidence in 1987, according to May, he told the press that “if returned he would 
move to abolish the provincial government system.”156Wingti aware of his unpopularity 
needed to stamp his authority to gain support in the upcoming 1987 elections. To increase 
his chances of winning the elections he chose to demonstrate “tough, decisive, disciplined 
leadership image in the short time he was PM”.157 In the 1987 elections he won back his 
Hagen Open seat but lost PM seat to Rabbie Namaliu. He remained in Parliament as the 
MP for Hagen open until the 1992 elections. 
       In the 1992 elections his policies were clean government and free education. 
According to May, “the government popularity was reducing due to corruption and their 
inability to handle the Bougainville crisis. Pangu Party (the majority party) also 
disintegrated due to disagreements about the handling of Bougainville issue”.158 
          Hence, it was an easy victory for Wingti, who went on to form a coalition 
government with the islands based People Progress Party (PPP) led by Julius Chan. He 
became Prime Minister and Chan became his deputy. In line with his policies, Wingti 
proposed a cleanup of PNG Politics; he began attacking the provincial government system. 
He argued that the provincial government system was costly, contentious and infested with 
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mismanagement and corruption. He argued for a total overhaul of the current system.159 He 
proposed to reduce the number of provincial politicians and give greater powers to the 
National MPs. The National Executive Council (NEC) along with the Opposition agreed to 
his proposition and the proposal was endorsed. However there was opposition from the 
New Guinea Island region including Bougainville in which the current provincial 
government system was thought to be working well. In response a bi-partisan 
Parliamentary Committee was created to review the future of the Provincial Government 
system.160 According to Standish, “the proposals by committee were intended to reform 
and probably weaken the provinces.”161 
        The Committee presented its report on March 1993, confirming extensive 
dissatisfaction with the current system of provincial government, and recommended “a 
system of decentralization comprising of provincial level authority consisting of national 
politicians and Local Level Council was recommended by the Committee in their 
report”.162 
      The report was therefore endorsed by the NEC, this paved way for the OLPG (1977) to 
be abolished in 1995 and replaced by the Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level 
Government(OLPLLG 1995). In August 1994 a mid-term change of government occurred; 
Deputy Prime Minister Julius Chan replaced Wingti, “he made it clear he aimed to 
continue with the reform”.163 
4.2.2 Reform under Chan 
       Julius Chan is from Tanga Island in the New Island Province. His father was a Chinese 
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merchant and his mother was a native of Tanga Island.164 He was educated in Marist 
College Ashgrove in Brisbane, Australia. Unlike Wingti, Chan was a high profile 
politician; in fact he was one of the founding fathers, who fought for independence 
alongside Somare. He entered politics in 1968, and in his first term was elected deputy 
speaker. He was the leader of People’s Progress Party (PPP) from 1970 until 1997 when he 
lost the national elections. He was twice prime minister, from 1980-1982 and again in 
1994-1997. He was deputy prime minister four times in 1976, 1985, 1986 and from 1992-
1994.165 Apart from that he held several senior ministerial portfolios such as minister for 
finance and minister for foreign affairs. During his political tenure he was involved in a 
major scandal (Sandline Affair) in 1997 in which his government signed a contract with 
Sandline International, a mercenary organization from South Africa in an attempt to end 
the ongoing civil war in Bougainville. According to May “the government of Julius Chan 
frustrated at the inability of the PNG Defense Force to achieve a military solution on 
Bougainville and facing an election (1997), became involved in negotiations with military 
consultants Sandline International.166. Amidst widespread protest in the country and the 
launch of an inquiry on 25th March, Chan decided to step down. He did so even though the 
Parliament defeated a motion calling on Chan to resign. He was cleared by the inquiry and 
reinstated on 2nd June 1997 just before the national elections;167 however he lost the 1997 
elections and remained inactive in the political arena for a decade. In 2007 he contested for 
the New Ireland Provincial Seat and won to remain in that position until now. 
        When Chan succeeded Wingti on August 1994 his policies were national security and 
appropriate economic management. Understandably so because at that time the civil war in 
Bougainville was still ongoing and PNG faced a financial crisis. As documented by 
                                                          
164
 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julius_Chan. 
165
See http://www.parliament.gov.pg/member-of-parliament/bio/view/hon-julius-chan-mp. 
166
 See May.R.J (2003) Disorderly Democracy: Political Turbulence and Institutional Reform in Papua New 
Guinea, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia, Canberra The Australian National University, and p.9. 
167
 Ibid.p.10.  
 61 
 
Sinclair, “PNG experienced a record budget deficit of K277.5 million in the first half of 
1994; this exceeded the estimated deficit for the entire year. The problem was that 
expenditure was more than the revenue “.168 This was also pointed out by Duncan that “the 
closure of the Panguna mine was a major blow to the economy”169 , additionally the 
ongoing civil war in Bougainville was proving to be quite costly for the government.  
       According to Chan the old system needed a review,170 this view was seen to be shared 
by the majority of the members of parliament; therefore the bill was a bipartisan bill. 
However, amidst all those problems why did the provincial government reform take 
precedence? Was the timing of the reform appropriate?  Actually, during the final reading 
of the bill several MPs mainly from the opposition were showing resistance, not to the bill 
but to the timing of the passing of the bill. They wanted more time so that their own 
recommendations could be included in the reform. They argued that although they were in 
support of the bill, they felt the bill was rushed and that the new system would be more 
expensive to run than the current one.171 According to Somare, “it would cost K200 million 
more that the current system”.172 Somare, Peter Lus, John Nilkare and Masket Iangalio 
among others (a total of 15) voted against the bill. Bart Philemon who was a minister at 
that time voted against the bill and as a consequence was stripped of the minister title. 
Others such as Roy Yaki and Iaro Lasaro who made a point to mention in parliament 
during the third readings of the bill that his “people were against the bill but he was going 
to vote for the bills, claiming that sometimes sacrifices need to be made”, although 
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maintained that the bill was rushed still voted for it173. The bill was passed on the floor of 
parliament with 86 votes for and 15 against174. 
      Chan in an interview conducted by Delvin and Mukharjee, when asked why he 
reformed the system replied that, “it was to address instability at the provincial level, 
reduce the cost of running provincial governments and reducing the number of MPs vying 
for ministerial portfolios (stability at national level)”175. He also wanted to address “the 
problem of distribution at the local level. He claimed that his vision at that time was to 
create a law that will enable local government to so much money so they can start bottom-
up planning”176. When asked (looking back) would he have done something different, he 
replied that “if he was in power back than it would have worked. He would have had the 
authority to force the governors’ to implement his vision…...”177. 
      In retrospect Chan’s political demise in 1997 had been attributed to two factors, the 
obvious reason being the Sandline Affair and the other is the 1995 reform to the provincial 
government. Pertaining to the 1995 reform, as will be elaborated later on, much of the 
opposition to the reform was from the New Guinea Islands region which also includes his 
people of the New Ireland Province. Ivarature observes that “his (Chan’s) role in going 
ahead to implement the reforms thwarted his and his party’s (PPP) image back home, to the 
extent where his own maternal cousin Ephraim Apelis challenged him for the seat and 
won”178. 
Ivarature states that, his (Chan’s) duties as prime minister also contributed to the 
neglect of his constituents ' needs and alienated him from them.
179
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For Wingti, he was his own downfall, according to Kolma: 
 
(I)t was his overconfidence. Naively assuming that his ten year programs for education 
and   infrastructure were in themselves sufficient to secure another term in parliament, 
Wingti failed to venture out and campaign.”180 
 
4.3 Opposition to the Reform 
The most vocal opposition to the reform was from the New Guinea Islands (NGI). In a 
meeting in Kimbe, West New Britain in April 1994, the NGI Premiers Council made a 
proposition for an alternative regional state government system for the NGI region. 
According to Sinclair, “they also threatened the government of PNG that if their proposal 
was ignored they would secede and form a Federated Melanesian Republic” 181 . NGI 
leaders went as far as threating the government to declare independence on 6th January 
1995. Chan, who was PM at that time responded by taking out an injunction to arrest NGI 
leaders for treason. However, no one was actually arrested or imprisoned.182 
     According to Delvin and Mukherjee, “Chan knew the threat from the NGI leaders was 
real and they were capable of carrying it out”. 183 Unlike the highlanders, the NGI people 
were exposed or had interactions’ with the outside world long before the highlanders. 
Therefore, they were well educated, and they knew what they were doing. Furthermore the 
closure of the Paguna Copper Mine, meant a reduction in revenue for the government, 
hence importance was put on the NGI region since they had significant potential revenue 
(Lihir Gold mine) 184 . However, while the NGI leaders were meeting in Rabaul in 
September, three volcanoes a couple of miles from where they were blew up at the same 
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time. According to Mukherjee, “the secessionist threat sort of rescinded as Rabaul which 
was the hot-bed of secession was badly affected185. The NGI leaders were focused more on 
rehabilitation than reform and talk of secession rescinded”186.  
In March 1995 the (reform) bill was tabled in Parliament and passed. The OLPG was 
replaced by the Organic Law on Provincial Government and Local Level Government 
(OLPGLLG).  As a reflection of the rivalry, under this new law, provincial premiers were 
abolished and more powers were given to the local MPs. 
 
          Looking at the period in which the reform took place, prior to and in 1994, PNG was 
going through a hard time. The civil war in Bougainville which started in 1988 was still 
ongoing; PNG had a financial crisis in 1994 and also had its fair share of natural disasters 
in the form of three volcanoes erupting at the same time in Rabaul. Furthermore there was 
so much instability at the National level which saw Prime Minister’s hardly completing 
their terms. Amidst all these, as if the government did not have a lot on its plate already, 
decided to reform the OLPG (1977).  
4.4 Real Intent of the Reform 
It is agreeable that the OLPG (1977) was due for a review, however, this study argues 
that the reasons (although real) put forward by Wingti and Chan were just pretexts to 
justify the reform and there was no real intention to enhance service delivery but to remove 
the “rivals” so as to appease backbenches in Parliament. 
Wingti and Chan had to maintain support within the Parliament to keep the PM post 
and also maintain support from their constituency and base votes. 
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Wingti and Chans role in reforming the system also hints upon the intra-parliamentary 
politics in PNG in which Prime Ministers fight to overcome the motion of no confidence 
and to stay in power. 
        PNG politics is also characterized by intra-parliament rivalry in which backbenchers 
have a sort of “veiled” influence on the government. The “vote of no confidence” system 
in PNG has been an avenue for lobbying for ministerial portfolios, parliament offices or 
access to financial resource. The 1977 OLPG provisions sidelined the backbenchers, with 
the Provincial Politicians in control of provincial and district affairs, backbenchers 
although they are members of Parliament felt they had “nothing”.  MPs holding ministerial 
portfolios and other parliamentary offices had resources especially financial resources 
under their control, backbenches did not, and this caused concern for them for their image 
back in their districts as distribution of resources (financial) converts to votes. 
Furthermore, the public also regard backbenches as nonentities, as a result backbenchers 
are nicknamed “briefcase carriers”, meaning they carry briefcase for the ministers. 
According to several voters in Eastern Highlands Province, districts’ whose members are 
ministers feel a sense of pride, they feel that they are on a more prestigious level than 
others, labelling other district MPs as “small boys”187 However, after the 1995 reform this 
image is starting to change since MPs also have control of the district’s budget, however if 
possible having ministerial portfolios is still a preferable for the tribesmen.188 
      Nevertheless, backbenchers can control the outcome of the vote of no confidence since 
they have the numbers, this is probably the only time they become relevant. Successive 
Prime Ministers in trying to maintain support from the backbenchers have tried various 
ways to appeal to the backbenchers. Electoral funds were introduced by the Somare 
government in 1984, each MP as that time was allocated K10, 000 annually to spend on his 
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or her own discretion on any project within his her electorate.189 The value of the EDF has 
increased rapidly over the years and is now at K10 million per district.190 The increase is a 
response to conciliate discontented backbenches. As noted by Ketan (2007), “all increase 
was due to pressure from the backbenches. He observed that, “Government backbenches 
threatened to join the opposition to topple the government through votes of no 
confidence”191 That is why   “Wingti increased the EDF in 1993 and 1994, Chan did it in 
1996 and Bill skate also increased the EDF in 1996”192. 
        Similarly, the need to reform the OLPG (1977) was from the pressure of 
backbenchers. Wingti and Chan had to address the issue for their own reason of not 
wanting to lose to a vote of no-confidence. They had to maintain support in Parliament. 
The provisions of the new reform were not a reflection of people’s wishes but a reflection 
of the MPs grievances. Consequently, in the subsequent national election in 1997 both 
Chan and Wingti lost to candidates who were less popular.  Chan lost to his own maternal 
cousin (Ephraim Apelis) indicating   fractures within his own people. 
      For Chan, he went against his peoples wish and reformed the system, compounded 
with the Sandline crisis his support was diminishing back home. According to the Peoples 
Progress Party Spoke person Ken Trezise when speaking on Chan’s loss, “sandline affair 
had less impact; it was due to local and parochial issues”193 Chan’s successor Ephraim 
Apelis was an advocate of greater autonomy for provincial government; according to 
Ivarature (2002) “his main reason for contesting the 1997 elections was to address the 
abolishment of the second tier government. He campaigned on the platform of “change”194. 
The New Irelanders frustrations of the reform of the provincial government system are 
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reflected in the 1997 national elections results. 
 
      The 1977 organic law on provincial government (OLPG), was replaced with the new 
organic law (OLPGLLG) in 1995. Several major changes took place, including the 
abolishment of the premier system and the introduction of the provincial governors, which 
changed the whole structure of the provincial and local government as well as the power 
players.  The new OLPGLLG also changed to empower the third tier government at the 
district level, the Local Level government (LLG) that is because the main aim of the 
reform was to strengthen the lower level of government closer to the people, that are also 
the unit of representation at the national parliament. 
      Another major addition was the creation of the Budget Priority Committee’s (BPC) at 
both the provincial and district level. At the district level the budget priority committee 
(JDPBPC) has become a dominant force, and has overshadowed the LLGs to the point 
where LLGs are almost inoperable. The creation of JDPBPC and its subsequent 
implications has compromised the legitimacy of the local government system. 
       These changes brought about by the reform, demonstrates   how the local MPs as 
being representatives will become more involved in district affairs. With the Premiers 
system abolished and the district level government empowered, and with the creation of 
the Budget Priority Committee, MPs now exert more influence than before. This change to 
the organic law reflects more of the MP’s grievances since the establishment of the 
Provincial Government System. Under the 1977 OLPG MPs felt incapacitated because 
they had no say in their district affairs, and this caused them a lot of insecurities pertaining 
to their base support, as seen under the new 1995 OLPGLLG MPs now exert more 
influence than anybody in the districts. As a direct consequence of this service delivery to 
most parts of the country has been few to none. The next chapter will look at the functions 
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of the changes introduced by the reform and what they constitute and how that impact 
upon the development of the districts.  
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Chapter 5: Changes and Issues after the Reform 
      The years from PNG’s independence in 1975 or enactment of 1977 OLPG and the 
reform by the 1995 OLPGLLG should be understood as a transitional period, in which 
local political leaders were struggling to adapt the “Big-Man Culture” to the modern 
political and administrative system of independent and sovereign nation, Papua New 
Guinea. From this point of view, the 1995 OLPGLLG can be seen as a document to 
celebrate the victory of national politicians, or MPs, over the provincial politicians, as there 
are no more MPA’s in the Provincial Assembly, and MPs will not have any issues 
fulfilling their “Big- Man” obligations using state resource. For instance, MPs are now able 
to physically go out and present cheques for projects in a ceremony with all the people 
witnessing, and also any completion of projects the MP has to be there in a ceremony to 
cut the ribbon. Now the people can see and feel the MP’s presence. 
        The reform did not have any national significance, as the introduction of preferential 
voting system had in 2007, hence it was no victory for any national leaders like Wingti or 
Chan to reform the political system to be more centralized. The biggest winners of the 
reform were the back benchers, i.e., the ordinary MPs claiming representation of their own 
districts. The new 1995 OLPGLLG basically allows MPs to be in charge of all the district 
funds. In other words, there will be no two representatives of the district, but politicians 
have to compete for the single seat as a sign of modern Big- man status. 
5.1 Provincial Government Structure under the 1995 OLPGLLG 
       Under the 1995 OLPGLLG Provincial Assembly consists of a Provincial MP elected 
by the whole Provincial electorate, all District MPs elected by the respective district 
electorates within the province, Local Level Government Heads (LLGH) elected among 
the Ward Councilors (WC) of the district and three other members (A) appointed by the 
Provincial MP as the Provincial Executive Council Chairman who is also the Provincial 
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Governor
195
. All members have full voting power and are counted towards a quorum of 
the Provincial Assembly
196
. Provincial MPs who are concurrently their respective 
Provincial Governors, are not eligible to take any national offices, while district MPs are. 
          Provincial Executive Council is the executive branch of the province, whose 
members consist of the Governor, who is the chairman of the Council, Deputy Governor, 
all the Chairman of the Permanent Committees (CPC). All members have voting rights 
and are counted towards the quorum.
197
  
     Provincial Executive Council is tasked with implementing the laws and the policies of 
the provincial governments and/or those of the National Government which the provincial 
governments are mandated to implement.
198
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Figure 5:  The Provincial Government Structure under the 1995 OLPGLLG 
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         The Organic Law on Provincial Government and Local-level Government 1995 is 
to replace the organic Law on Provincial Governments 1977. Before the reform, 
Provincial Government was formed on the basis of the Provincial Assembly whose 
members with voting rights were separately elected at the districts within the province. 
Those members of Parliament from the districts in the same province could also attend 
the meetings of the Provincial Assembly but they didn’t have any voting right. 
Provincial Premier, the head of the Provincial Executive Council, was elected form 
among the Members of Provincial Assembly with voting right. Thus, actual function of 
the Provincial Government went without any strong influence from the MPs of the 
Province. 
      After this reform, no separate members for Provincial Assembly are elected from 
any districts and MPs from the Open Electorate in the same province become full 
members of the Provincial Assembly. Provincial Premier was also abolished and, 
instead a new MP form the Province-wide electorate is to be elected and to 
automatically become the Provincial Governor. As a result, provincial autonomy is lost 
due to the conflict of central and provincial interest for the MPs. 
           This change could be seen as the take-over of the provincial power by the national 
politicians at the cost of local politicians, which might be criticized by those 
decentralization forces who had fought against the government for more decentralized 
structure at the time of independence and the Bougainville issues. 
     Thus the second feature of the reform, i.e., creation of the Local-level Governments was 
there to emphasize the continued importance of decentralization by pushing it further by 
establishing the governments closer to the people than the Provincial Governments. 
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5.3 Creation of the Local- Level Government (LLG) 
         The Local-Level Government were created below the District level by the 1995 
reform and become the third tier of the government system. The official aim to create the 
Local-Level Government was to promote ‘equal opportunity and popular participation in 
government ‘and ‘responsible citizenship through self-management, and control and 
accountability for one’s action.199 OLPGLLG provides for the role of the Local-Level 
Government as ‘to make laws for the purpose of governing the local community’.200 
Therefore, LLG is mainly a legislative body that also executive functions,
201
 though its 
administrative system is headed by the District Administrator as ‘the chief executive 
officer of the Local-level Governments in a district’.202 
        Members of the Local-Level Government are; the Local-level Government Head 
(LLGH) and Ward Councilors(WC), plus three appointed members in the case of urban 
LLG and two appointed members in the case rural LLG. All those members including 
appointed members of LLG have full voting power and are counted towards the quorum 
during meetings of the LLG. Three appointed members for the urban LLG are one 
nominated by the PNG Trade Union Congress(L), one nominated by the Employers 
Federation (E), and a representative of women’s organizations nominated in accordance 
with an Act of Parliament (W), all of whom are to be appointed by the LLG. Two 
appointed members for the rural LLG are representatives of women’s’ organizations 
nominated in accordance with an Act of Parliament and appointed by the LLG (W).
203
 
      The members of a Ward, which is an administrative unit in PNG meaning the cluster of 
villages or settlements within the area of the Local-Level Government, are to elect their 
own Ward Councilor (WC). LLG heads (LLGH) are also known as LLG Presidents and 
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elected whole area of the LLG and he/she is also known as the LLG President. The Open 
Electorate representative from the District, who is a Member of Parliament as well as a 
member of Provincial Assembly, is not a member of the Local Level Government.
204
 
The LLG administrative functions include:
205
 
 preparing corporate plans and estimates; 
 preparing a rolling five year development plan taking into account rolling five year 
development plans for wards as prepared by the elected ward members; 
 preparing an annual plan taking into account the rolling five year development plan 
 preparing annual budgets based on the annual plan within all funds available to the 
LLG; 
 keeping proper accounts and records; 
 facilitating for the development of renewable natural resources development 
projects in the LLG area; 
 constructing and maintaining infrastructure and facilities that are the responsibility 
of the LLG; 
 initiating and implementing programs for youth and women and 
 Providing support and assistance to the Provincial Government to enable it to carry 
its functions effectively. 
        While a provincial executive wing has Provincial Administrator as its chief executive 
officer, a local-level government has not its own chief executive officer but has to share 
one District Administrator as its chief executive officer with other local-level governments 
in the same district.
206
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       District Administrator is to ‘coordinate policy formulation, planning and 
implementation of Local-Level Government policies and plans as required by Sections 
33A and 106’.207 Section 33 A is about the Joint District Planning and Budget Priority 
Committee, which will be discussed in the next section, while Section 106 deals with the 
Provincial Planning and Data Systems that prepares the basis for elections planning. 
District Administrator also ‘liase(s) and consult(s) with the District Treasurer on 
budget and treasury matters.’ Since two or more LLGs are supposed to exist in one district, 
and budget or treasury matters within the district are liaised or consulted by the District 
Administrator, it is not LLGs but District Administrator who has actual control over the 
treasury issues, even if she/he ‘shall comply with ‘any policy directions from the 
Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments’.208. 
If the District Administrator is this powerful, the question is she/he is whose agent. 
OLPGLLG stipulates that she/he shall be ‘appointed in the manner and following the same 
procedure as is applicable to the appointment of officers of the Public Service.’  However, 
in reality, District Administrators are chosen by the Members of Parliament elected from 
the same district, i.e., the Open Electorate.
209
 From the positioning of the District 
Administrators as an umbrella office over the LLGs, as well as how they are actually 
appointed, they are expected to work for the Open Electorate MPs of the districts rather 
than for the LLGs they have to act as chief executives.  With this role District 
Administrator also serves for the Joint District and Budget Priority Committee as its Chief 
Executive Officer.  
        This positioning of the District administrator suggests that the focus of the local-level 
government is on the district rather than anything below it. As expressed by the Ward 
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Councilors of Daulo District all they are able to do is submit proposal and request made by 
their people, the decision is made by the JDPBPC in which they are not members of.
210
 
There are funds made available by the central government for the LLGs, known as the 
Local Level Government Support Improvement Program grants (LLGSIP), but these funds 
are managed by the JDPBPC. It is given to the wards upon requests. The DA is the one that 
approves or disapproves of the proposals. Twelve of the twenty-three Daulo ward 
councilors interviewed complained that they hardly receive positive response from the 
district government, and whenever they get response from the district government, the 
payment is usually half or a quarter of the amount requested, which results in many project 
hold up
211
. Eight of those ward councilors stated that, the system is unfavorable and they 
have no trust in the system. Because of the lack of response from the Headquarters 
(District), they sometimes try to talk to the MP himself, his relatives or other district staff 
in the hope of getting a response.
212
 
From this point of view the LLG is incapacitated. Weather the LLGs voice is effective or 
not is decided at the district level. 
 
5.4 Creation of the Joint District Planning and Budget Priority Committees 
(JDPBPC) 
       Another important change after the reform is the removal of the budgetary powers 
pertaining to districts from the Provincial Governments by creating a Joint District 
Planning and Budget Priority Committee.  Districts were now in charge of their own 
budget and affairs, although without any District Governments. 
Joint Planning and Budget Priority Committees are to be established not only at the 
district level but also at the provincial level.  As each of the districts corresponds to an 
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Open Electorate
213
, each of the Joint Provincial/District Planning and Budget Priority 
Committees has its own Provincial or Open Electorate MP.  These committees are 
recipients of a half of the District or Provincial Support Grant, another half of which goes 
to the Open Electorate or Provincial MP. 
District and Provincial Support Grants are grants to be provided annually by the 
National Government to the open and provincial electorates.  These grants were added to 
the list of grants in 1996 and 1998 amendments to OLPGLLG and, different from other 
central grants, are not given to the local governments but to the Joint District/Provincial 
Planning and Budget Priority Committees and the MPs.  While those other central grants 
given to the local governments are conditional in the sense on the request and approval 
basis, or supplementary to the administrative needs, District and Provincial Support Grants 
are guaranteed their minimum amounts and relative freedom in their usages within the 
guidelines, hence a kind of pork barrels. 
As the recipient bodies of District or Provincial Support Grants, Joint 
District/Provincial Planning and Budget Priority Committees play important roles for the 
development of the districts and the provinces.  Moreover, both the committees  are (a) to 
oversee, co-ordinate and make recommendations as to the overall planning in the 
province/district planning, including budget priorities, for consideration by the National 
Government/the Provincial Government and the National Government; (b) to determine 
and control (the) budget allocation priorities for the Province/Local-level Governments in 
the district; (c) to approve Provincial/the Local-level Government Budgets for presentation 
to the Provincial Assembly/Local-level Government (and make recommendations 
concerning them); (d) to draw up a rolling five-year development plan and annual 
estimates for the province/district; and (e) to conduct annual reviews of the rolling five-
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year development plan
214
. Thus, as far as the budget priorities and development planning 
are concerned, these joint committees have real controlling power.   
However, while a Joint Provincial Planning and Budget Priority Committee is to be 
established by the Provincial Executive Council, no legal body is designated to establish a 
Joint District Planning and Budget Priority Committee. Since both the Provincial 
Executive Council and Local-level Government are permitted to establish their own 
committees including permanent committees, the fact that  the Joint District Planning and 
Budget Priority Committee is to be established not by any of the local governments but by 
law itself is noteworthy. 
As Figure 5 suggests, JPPBPC is so structured as the Open Electorate MPs can 
effectively exert their influence over the course of debates in the committee, if they are 
four or more and work together, since the maximum number of members from or 
appointed by Provincial Executive Council is four
215
.  And as Big-men of their own 
districts, they may share the same interest of giving priorities to the districts rather than to 
the provinces. 
On the other hand, JDPBPC may work differently as at the district level there is no 
legislature or executive but an Open Electorate MP and a District Administrator only that 
legitimately represent and administer the whole area.  Like JPPBPC, each of JDPBPCs has 
four members on the Open Electorate MP’s side, i.e., the Open Electorate MP him-/herself 
and maximum of three appointees (a) by the Open Electorate MP.  Other members are the 
LLG Heads (LLGH) within the district so that, if the number of LLGHs is larger than four, 
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and if they work together, they can control the JDPBPC.  However, only 21 % of the 
districts have more than four LLGHs
216
.    
The JDPBPC functions include the determination and control of budget allocation 
priorities for the Local-level Governments in the district, approval of the Local-level 
Government budgets for presentation to the Local-level Government and making 
recommendations concerning them.
217
  Thus LLGs cannot decide their own budget by 
themselves but have to get approval from JDPBPC controlled by the Open Electorate MPs. 
     The JDPBPC role is highlighted here because it is the committee in charge of all 
budgetary matter pertaining to the district. Prior to the reform all budgetary matters for the 
districts including recurrent expenditures were under the Provincial government with the 
Premier as the head.  MPs were given Electoral Funds starting in the 1980s. The grants 
were allocated directly to the local MPs with the assumption that local MPs are well 
situated to be more aware of local needs and therefore can use the grants on priority 
projects.
218
  After the reform both the recurrent expenditure and the Electoral Development 
Funds now known as District Support Grants (DSG) were placed under the JDPBPC. Fifty 
percent of the DSG is called the MPs discretionary grant and is paid directly to the MP. 
The MP being the chair of the committee makes him in control of the entire budget of the 
district. 
This also creates an avenue for Big-man politics to thrive, meaning that members of 
the JDPBPC are now seen by the people as being in charge of funds which they can 
channel to them, and for the MP, not only expectations are high of him but he has the 
discretion to hand out resources if he wants to do so and legally does so for that matter. 
                                                          
216
 Among the total of 84 Districts only 18 Districts have more than 4 LLGs. 
217
 Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government Section 95 Subsection 5 
218
 Ketan, J (2007) The Use and Abuse of the Electoral Development Funds and their Impact on Electoral 
Political Governance in Papua New Guinea, CDI Policy Paper on Political Governance.p.5. 
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The 1995 OLPGLLG enables the MP to hand out cash and cheques for the projects 
personally in his district because all the district developmental funds are at his disposal.  
This opportunity is used strategically at times to make their presence felt in their 
districts.  For the LLG heads, theoretically speaking they have certain powers in the 
JDPBPC affairs; however under the current structure MPs largely control the budget 
allocation and overrides the heads of LLGs, therefore most of them also end up with trying 
to be on the MPs good side.  Likewise the LLG representatives (ward councilors) are also 
at the mercy of the MPs. 
5.5 Effects of the 1995 Reform 
         If the 1995 reform was so structured, what consequences are found in the politics and 
development at the Local-level?  Interviews were conducted by the author with Ward 
Councilors and LLG Presidents of Ungai-Bena District and Daulo Districts to gauge their 
views on the JDPBPC impacts upon their roles as ward and LLG representatives within 
their districts. Daulo district has three LLGs, which are Watabung LLG with six wards, 
Upper Asaro LLG with eight wards and Lower Asaro LLG with nine wards, to make a 
total number of wards twenty three. Twelve out of the twenty-three ward councilors and 
two out of the three LLG Presidents were interviewed. Ungai-Bena district also has three 
LLGs; they are Upper Bena with seven wards, lower Bena with seven wards and Ungai 
with six wards, to make a total number of wards twenty. Nine out of the twenty ward 
councilors and one out of the three LLG Presidents were interviewed. 
         Questions were asked to find out the roles and functions of LLG. Relationship 
between the Ward Councilors and their LLG presidents on the one side and the MP and 
district staffs under the District Administrator on the other side is considered to be 
important because under the 1995 OLPGLLG MPs yields more power in the districts 
affairs through the JDPBPC. Whether this has any impact on the roles of the Councilor and 
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of the LLG Presidents in their LLGs and what is the consequences of MPs dominating the 
JDPBPC are significant among others.
219
 
    Most of the Daulo District’s respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the MP and the 
district staff. 
    The Ward 2 councilor for lower Asaro stated that: 
       
(A)ny project we propose has to be approved by the DA and the JDPBPC, and many a 
times we never get any response, and on the rare occasions that we do, the payment is 
usually a half or a quarter of the amount requested.”220 
      
The interviews suggests that  the demands form the LLGs are usually ignored and most of 
the projects pushed through by the JDPBPC are not in line with the needs of the local 
people or are only concentrated in one area, i.e., the MP’s village/clan which is translated 
into “base vote” during Elections. In Daulo district, in Upper Asaro LLG, there has never 
been an MP from there since independence, and it is in a deteriorating state. The ward 8 
councilor for Upper Asaro was interviewed on the number of ongoing projects in his ward. 
He replied: 
 
None, we Kwongi (ward 8&9) people are ‘bush’ people, government has forgotten 
about us. Everything has deteriorated. Ask your (author) father, he used to teach there, 
he will tell you nothing has changed. The same desk he used to sit on is still there. We 
supported him in 1992 election, because if he had won, Kwongi would have changed. 
But 2017(General Elections) is coming we will still try.”221 
 
                                                          
219
 Refer to Table 1 in the Appendices. 
220
 Based on interviews conducted in Daulo on December 2016. For Daulo ward councilors’ they asked for 
anonymity so their names are withheld. Refer to table 1.1. 
221
 Ibid.  
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Furthermore, in Lower Asaro, Ward 2 and 1 are located opposite each other them, 
Ward 1 has electricity connected right through its villages, while Ward 2 is in complete 
darkness. That was because in 1992 elections Sowa Gunia form ward 1 won the elections 
and delivered to his people. Even though the Voting System in PNG changed from the 
First Past the Post System to the Preferential Voting System, candidates still focus on their 
base voters to get 1
st
 votes, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 votes are called ‘pick up votes’. Hence, it is 
assumed that if their base is secured they have a shot at winning the elections.
222
 
This is one of the main cause for uneven distribution of services within the districts.  
      For Daulo District, ten out of the twelve councilors interviewed stated that there was no 
single ongoing project in their respective wards at the time of interview. When asked about 
the projects during their term, nine answered that there was no project at all and three had 
projects done in their wards. Stating that they were done by the MP and the DA without 
prior consultation with them. This indicates that they were sidelined on the issues 
concerning their own Wards. 
      The dominating nature of the MP and the JDPBPC is a problem in regards to service 
delivery in PNG because almost all the funds that are for the upkeep and running of the 
districts comes from the national governments as grants and all these funds are managed by  
the JDPBPC. 
In Papua New Guinea, the Provincial and Local government has limited revenue 
making powers so that most of its fund comes from the national government in the form of 
grants. The problem here is that it is up to the JDPBPC or rather the MP, on whether they 
want to use these grants for projects beneficial to the district as a whole or part of the 
district or not at all. 
                                                          
222
 Bernard Noibano contested the Daulo Open seat in 2012 and 2017 General Elections. 
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After all any spending or projects that is approved by the JDPBPC is legal. The funds 
are placed under the care of the MPs, so they can be able to identify priority projects and 
implement them in their districts and at the same it enables them to have the chance to be 
physically present to distribute these funds and maintain their support base. Most times 
funds are not going to where they are supposed to go resulting in lack of, to nonexistence 
of basic services in most districts in the country, be it infrastructure, electricity, roads, 
health care, clean water and the list goes on. For example Daulo residents have called out 
for relevant authorities to investigate the Daulo Districts use of the DSIP grants for years 
2013 to 2014. They complained that no development whatsoever have taken place at all in 
Daulo at that time. 223  Similarly the people of Abau district in Central Province have 
questioned the use of K150 million (3 terms) in DSIP funds, stating the promised 
reopening of Magarida Airstrip never happened, meanwhile the hospital lacks medical 
supplies, water supply lacking despite rivers found everywhere in the district and also the 
deteriorating of the districts high school.224  These problems are not only confided to Abau 
and Daulo, these same issues is found all over the country. There is just too much 
misappropriation of public funds that the director of the PNG Institute of National Affairs, 
Paul Baker, has warned that the access abuse of these funds will “undermine the impacts of 
the PNG National Budget, because they form a large part of the budget.225 
 
     The DSIP grants have increased tremendously over the years and currently stands at 
K10,000,000 (USD3.1million) per district, per year.  The increase is somewhat expected, 
since the national budget itself has increased steadily over the past years. As shown in 
Figure 3, the PNG budget as of 2015 stands at K16 billion. 
                                                          
223
 See The National Newspaper, Wednesday March 25
th
 2015. 
224
See The National Newspaper, October 5
th
 2016. 
225
 See EMTV News, 20th January 2015. 
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Figure 6 PNG DSIP Grants
226
 
 
Figure 7 PNG Annual Budgets 227 
Finance ministers have consecutively justified the increase in DSIP by maintaining 
that the local governments in PNG are unsuccessful because they are underfunded. As 
reflected in the 2013 Budget in which the DSIP grants were increased from K5 million to 
K10 million, Finance Minister Don Poyle stated: 
 
                                                          
226
 Based on PNG Yearly Budget Reports for the years 1984-2016. 
227
 Based on PNG Yearly Budget Reports from the years 1986-2015. 
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We will empower our people by giving greater financial responsibility and 
accountability to lower levels of the Governments. It is our conviction that 
empowering Governments that are closer to our people will significantly improve the 
delivery of vital goods and services.……228 
 
Almost the same statement was made in the 2014 Budget Reports: 
 
These funds are not translated into the change in outlook of the districts in PNG. This 
study does not criticize or find fault in the increase of the funding itself in relation to 
developmental issues. However, the management these funds is the problem.  
 
     Despite that, there are districts that have benefited from these funds.  Ungai-Bena 
district of Eastern Highlands Province and the Wau-Bulolo district of Morobe Province are 
two of the successful cases. This implies that if used wisely the grants can bring 
development to the districts as initially intended even under the current structure. The 
system of the Provincial Government and  LLG is such that so much power is concentrated 
at the District headed by the MP, therefore weather the LLGs within the district can benefit 
or not depends entirely on the MPs willingness to engage or not. Therefore, different 
behaviors of the MPs with his district staff determine different outcomes in districts, as 
will be illustrated in chapter six by discussing the case of Ungai-Bena and Daulo Districts. 
 
  
  
                                                          
228
  Polye.D, National Budget (2013) Volume 1 Economic and Development Policies, December, p. 3. 
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Chapter 6: Impacts of the 1995 OLPGLLG on the LLG: A Case Study of Ungai-Bena 
and Daulo District in Eastern Highlands Province. 
6.1 Background of Ungai-Bena and Daulo District 
  
Figure 8 Political Map of the Eastern Highlands Province 229 
 
     Daulo district is located at the north of Eastern Highlands Province, sharing borders 
with Chimbu and Madang Province. It has a population of 30,960
230
 and is located along 
the Highlands highway leading to other highlands provinces. Most people live a 
subsistence living. The mains source of income is from coffee, followed by the selling of 
vegetables. Although the land is fertile and produces good harvest, people still live in 
poverty.
231
 
                                                          
229
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Highlands_Province. 
230
 PNG National Bureau of Statistics, National Census Report 2014. 
231
 Poverty in both Daulo and Ungai-Bena does not refer to the unavailability of food but rather it refers non 
access of basic services and the inability to generate enough income to sustain them. 
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      Ungai-Bena also shares border with Chimbu and Madang provinces. It has a population 
of 40,006
232
. Most of the people are involved in subsistence farming. Main form of income 
is also from coffee and selling vegetables. Majority of the people still live in poverty.  
Although there is difference in culture and language in Ungai and Bena sectors, they share 
a commonality such as their religious belief, as Ungai-Bena is significantly dominated by 
the Seventh Day Adventist church, and that can be a unifying factor in the district.  Daulo 
on the other hand does not have such a single commonality among the peoples within the 
district as it is fragmented in terms of language, culture and even religious beliefs. 
           Geographically, Daulo has harsher condition than Ungai-Bena because it is 
overwhelmingly mountainous, while Ungai-Bena is located in the valleys. Hence, the 
temperature in Daulo is colder than Ungai-Bena.  This difference in climate also accounts 
for the difference in vegetables produced. Ungai-Bena mostly produces pineapples and 
oranges, while Daulo mostly produces sweet potatoes, potatoes and cabbage. Furthermore, 
the difference in geographical features sets favorable conditions for Ungai-Bena 
infrastructural development such as construction of roads in the sense that constructing 
roads to connect LLGs in Daulo will be more difficult and costly because of the rough 
terrain the district has.  This also means unfavorable conditions for the farmers in Daulo to 
carry their products to the markets in urban areas like Goroka, the Provincial Capital of 
Eastern Highlands, while Ungai-Bena has easier access to Goroka town. 
Apart from the geographical difference, both districts have basic similarities such as 
their dependence on their agricultural produce and having the same status as Rural LLG’s. 
Although both districts share border with Chimbu and Madang, there is no advantage for 
them to exploit Chimbu and Madang markets. This is due to the rugged, impassable terrain 
separating both districts from Chimbu and Madan Provinces. 
                                                          
232
 PNG National Bureau of Statistics, National Census Report 2014. 
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        The purpose of this case study is to analyze the impacts of the 1995 OLPGLLG on 
local governments in PNG by referring to concrete cases. The Ungai-Bena and Daulo 
Districts are chosen out of the eight districts in Eastern Highlands Province because these 
two districts represent the two extremes in terms of development indicators such as 
infrastructural developments, various initiatives to support locals and the organization of 
the district headquarters itself.  Ungai-Bena is the most developed and organized district, 
and in stark contrast to that, Daulo district was the least developed district in the province 
according to similar indicators mentioned above. This case study attempts to find out why 
one district is better off than the other, or rather what allows for development to take place 
in one district and not the other. 
        For this case study interviews were conducted with LLG representatives of both 
Ungai-Bena and Daulo districts, the District Administrator of Ungai-Bena was interviewed 
along with some district staff of Daulo District. Daulo district has three LLGs, which are 
Watabung LLG with six wards, Upper Asaro LLG with eight wards and Lower Asaro with 
nine wards, which is a total of twenty three wards. Twelve out of the twenty-three 
councilors were interviewed. Ungai-Bena District also has three LLGs, Ungai with six 
wards, Upper-Bena with seven wards and Lower Bena with seven wards which are total of 
twenty wards. Nine out of the twenty councilors were interviewed. Additionally one 
Council President was interviewed out of the three in Ungai-Bena District and two out of 
three Council President of Daulo was interviewed. All interviews were conducted on a one 
to one basis on various locations in Goroka town, Daulo and Ungai-Bena Districts. 
           Since this dissertation discusses the impacts of the 1995 OLPGLLG with particular 
focus on the LLG, district officials including the District Administrator of Ungai-Bena 
District and council representatives of two selected district were targeted.  The focus is on 
the LLG because, when the Organic Law was reformed in 1995, the LLGs were created 
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below the District level to become the third tier of the government system. The official aim 
to create this level of government was to promote equal opportunity and popular 
participation in government and responsible citizenship through self-management, control 
and accountability for one’s action.233 
       From that point of view LLG is supposed to be at the center of the reform.  However, 
in reality as illustrated in earlier chapters, power is concentrated at the district level without 
any formal government. Therefore, in an attempt to analyze the effectiveness of the local 
government in line with the 1995 OLPGLLG provisions, questions were focused on 
effectiveness of local representatives, budgetary matters, projects and the relationship 
between the MP, district staff and the local representatives (ward councilors). 
         Apart from the key individual interviews, unstructured interviews were conducted 
randomly among members of the public in EHP, the focus was on the residents of Daulo 
and Ungai-Bena Districts but residents of other districts gave their views too. The aim was 
to gauge a general view on the impacts of the provincial government system, and to know 
how much people have benefitted from government services individually and collectively 
over the years. 
Apart from interviews the level of development in each district’s was assessed based 
on outlook of the districts. Indicators included mostly infrastructural developments, state of 
schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, state of district headquarters and number of ongoing 
projects. This is because grants allocated to the districts are for impact projects and mostly 
infrastructural, hence the change or no change in outlook of the districts physically is one 
yard stick that can be used to determine whether these grants are effectively used or not. 
. 
                                                          
233
 See Preamble of 1995 OLPGLLG. 
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6.2 Organization of District Headquarters 
      According to Section 74 Subsection 2 of the 1995 OLPGLLG it is the responsibility of 
the DA to ensure the smooth running of the districts. The DA has to ensure all the district 
staffs are present in their office and working and also ensure the smooth running of LLGs 
in the district. Additionally the DA is responsible for ensuring proper implementation of 
projects and work programs identified by the JDPBPC.
234
 
      In comparison to Daulo, Ungai-Bena is a very well organized districts in terms of the 
arrangement of the district HQ itself and how their policies are implemented.  The district 
is administered by the DA along with twenty staff including casuals. Their district 
headquarters is currently located in Goroka town (capital of EHP) because it is easily 
accessed by both Ungai and Bena people, however there is a new office complex and staff 
housing project going on at the moment in Upper Bena. According to the DA
235
 all the 
staffs are present in their office from Monday to Friday (including himself).  Council 
presidents and the local MP have their offices there too. The current MP Benny Allan is 
also a Minister, and is sometimes caught up in his ministerial duties.  But whenever he is 
around he is always in his office. As for the LLGs their council chamber is currently under 
construction, there is constant communication between the DA and the Ward councilors
236
, 
       The district head quarter of Daulo is located in Asaro, some 15 kilometers outside of 
Goroka town.  Like all the other districts, Daulo, too, has a district office statutorily 
administered by the District Administrator
237
. 
Apart from the Administrator, the administrative staffs reside within the 
headquarters premises. According to the district staffs, the officers are open with officers 
present daily on weekdays. However, public perceptions contradict to this.  It is known in 
                                                          
234
 See Section 74 Subsection 2 of the OLPGLLG. 
235
 The DA for Ungai-Bena was interviewed on 07th January 2016 in Goroka Eastern Highland Province. 
236
 Ward Councilors, Council Presidents were interviewed on 07th January 2016 in Goroka Eastern Highland 
Province. 
237
 See Section 74 Subsection 2 of the OLPGLLG. 
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Daulo District that the offices in the headquarters are hardly open and when they do they 
are hardly any staffs around
238
. It is rare to see the DA himself in his office and the MP is 
hardly there at all. According to a district staff, even the JDPBPC meetings are not held in 
the district headquarters but are usually held in lodges or hotels in Goroka town especially 
when the district budget is being passed.
239
  During the research several visits were made 
from December 8 to 29, 2015, and January 4 to 6, 2016, to the District Headquarter but all 
the offices were always closed. 
      The reason why district headquarters were established within the district is for the 
people actually to see and feel the presence of the government, to have access to the 
government, to be able to participate in and to have a say on issues that concerns them. 
That was the main reason for decentralization
240
 , and the 1995 reform. For the case of 
Daulo, having a district headquarters that hardly operates defeats the whole purpose of 
decentralization. The people feel detached from the government and it is the wrong foot to 
start with. When the district officers are not open, people cannot have access to it, meaning 
that whatever they need from the district office they cannot get or do. The ward councilors 
of Daulo also complained that, they do not have access to the DA or the district staff 
whenever they have issues to discuss
241
. The image that the government is unreachable is 
persistent in Daulo.  
Ungai-Bena on the other hand is a case of a well-organized and functioning district 
headquarters. People of Ungai-Bena have access to the offices and officials on a daily 
basis; the MP is always in his office whenever he is in town. At the time I was 
                                                          
238
According to interviews for residents of Daulo, interview was conducted on the period between December 
and January 2016. 
239
 The District Staff was interviewed in 2013 February in Lopi, Goroka Eastern Highlands Province. He was 
a staff of the district treasury at the time of interview. When interviewed he was on his way to Jubilee lodge 
in which the JDPBPC were seated at that time. 
240
 See the Constitutional Planning Committee Report 1974. 
241
 Ward Councilors, Council Presidents were interviewed on 07th January 2016 in Goroka Eastern Highland 
Province. 
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interviewing the Ungai-Bena district staff, I saw the MP in his office and people were 
arranging in line outside to take turns to see him. Apart from having a well-organized 
district office and so many projects underway, the MP is physically present in the office 
talking to people whenever he is in town. This earns him so much respect from the people. 
        While this may be so one noticeable thing about both districts is that the LLG which 
is the government body does not have office or staff. While Ungai-Bena is taking steps to 
rectify that by building council chambers in their three LLGs, Daulo has done nothing as 
yet. This brings the question of how LLGs function when they do not have office?  LLGs 
representative of both districts have stated that, they felt their job is a part time job, 
because they do not have any office hence are not required to be at the headquarters, unless 
they are needed.
242
 This indicates that all issues are dealt with at the district level and not 
the LLG level. 
 
6.3 Relationship between, MP, District Staff and LLG Representatives 
The Ungai-Bena district staff, MP, council president and councilors have a very cordial 
relationship and they put emphasis on team work. Their communication with each other is 
very effective. According to the DA, and Councilors
243’, their communication with the 
local MP is very effective. Whenever, they call the MP he answers and he is very prompt 
in his response. He even replies text messages. In 2016 the district has set up a hotline to 
deal with emergency situations in their districts. When asked about their wages, the 
councilors responded that they were paid on time. 
       For the Daulo District there appears to be so much disconnection between the council 
presidents, the ward councilors and the district staff on the one hand and the MP on the 
                                                          
242
 Interview was conducted from 2015-2015. 
243
 Councilors and Council Presidents of Ungai-Bena were interviewed on 07
th
 January 2016 in Goroka 
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other
244
.  The councilors mentioned that they are always sidelined by the DA, the MP and 
the Council Presidents. Beckson Kia, the council president of Watabung, stated that there 
is no good relationship and effective communication with the MP
245
. Daulo councilors 
were complaining that their wages have not being paid for a couple of months. The 
councilor for ward 2 lower Asaro has stated that he has not being paid in over two years. 
Another councilor for lower Asaro, ward 3 has stated that “this kind of hold up in payment 
of wages makes him want to misuse public funds, because he needs to provide for his 
family”246. Other ward councilors also expressed similar sentiments. 
       Once again the lack of involvement of the LLG representatives (ward councilors) by 
the district HQ in the case of Daulo, defeats the purpose of the reform and decentralization 
in the country. The reform was aimed at empowering the local government hence a third 
tier of government (LLG) was added after the reform, it was intended to further 
decentralize power to the LLGs to make them more effective in service delivery and 
increase local participation. When LLG representatives are ignored, this indicates that the 
local communities are also ignored. That becomes are problem, because the locals 
communities channel of communication is ineffective and this also impacts upon 
prioritizing of projects by the JDPBPC. The structure of the district office and the LLGs is 
such that good relationship and effective communication between the LLG representatives 
and the District staff especially the DA and MP is vital. All decisions pertaining to the 
LLGs are made at the district level, the DA is the CEO of the LLG hence communication 
between him and the LLG representative is vital. 
                                                          
244
 Councilors and Council Presidents of Daulo were interviewed on January 2016 in various places in 
Goroka town and Daulo district. 
245
 Ibid. 
246
 Ibid. 
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6.4 LLG and District Finances 
        The local government has limited revenue making powers so much of its revenue and 
recurrent expenditures come from the national government in the form of grants as 
previously explained.247 One difference in this regard between the Ungai-Bena and Daulo 
districts is that Ungai-Bena uses the partnership methods.  According to the Ungai-Bena 
DA, apart from these grants the Ungai-Bena has also sought partnership with organizations 
such as European Union and have built their districts LLG offices partly funded by the EU.  
They also submit project proposals directly to the National Government for funding under 
the Complimentary Support Grants upon request
248
.For instance, when it comes to small 
scale projects like water supply to a village, the villages contribute some to the LLG 
assistance (LLGSIP) and if they are still in short, the JDPBPC steps in to cover the cost. 
For one or two big scale projects they have also sought partnerships. Another advantage 
for Ungai-Bena is that their MP Benny Allen is a senior Minister and has established 
connections hence is easier for him to sought partnership and also having his grants 
proposal approved.
249
 
       Daulo on the other hand did not have such initiatives of seeking other funds to develop 
the districts at the time of the interview. Daulo basically focuses on the DSIP&LLGSIP 
funds alone. Although the DSIP funds have been increasing over the past years, there is no 
reason why Daulo District should not utilized other options available as Ungai- Bena is 
doing. The problem with relying on the DSIP alone is that it limits the number of projects 
districts can do. For example, according to the project officer, projects in Daulo are limited 
to the DSIP funds available yearly
250
. While the DA of Ungai-Bena also expressed that the 
                                                          
247
 See Chapter 4. 
248
 The DA for Ungai-Bena was interviewed on 07th January 2016 in Goroka Eastern Highland Province. 
249
 Bernard Noibano interviewed on 22
nd
 August 2017 through Facebook conference call. 
250
 Councilors and Council Presidents of and District staff of Daulo were interviewed on January 2016 in 
various places in Goroka town and Daulo district. 
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number of projects also depend on the availability of funds, the difference is that Ungai-
Bena has more funds due to sourcing them from other sources as opposed to Daulo who 
focus solely on the DSIP. So definitely number of projects in Ungai-Bena will be more 
than that in Daulo. 
While the DSIP is managed by the JDPBPC, the LLGSIP is managed by the DA.
251
 
The LLG itself does not have any authority or control over issues and finances concerning 
them. 
6.5 Joint District Planning &Budget Priority Committees (JDPBPC) 
        The JDPBPC as explained in Chapter Five is an important committee in the district 
because it is in charge of all the matters in regards to the districts project planning and 
budget allocation. Apart from the Council Presidents being members of the committee by 
law, it is the prerogative of the MP as the chairman to choose the other 3 members in 
consultation with the council presidents. This in itself can be problematic as argued earlier 
because it can create a patronage system and increases the chances of the nepotism and 
cronyism, in regards to the MPs right to choose whoever he wants to. 
             The Ungai-Bena JDPBPC consist of the local MP as the Chairman, council 
presidents and three other appointed members as stipulated by the 1995 OLPGLLG. 
According to the DA the appointment of the nominated members is the right of the 
chairman; however, there are criteria’s in place for him to follow252. He has to choose a 
Church representative, currently
253
 selected from the Ungai LLG, a Community 
representative, selected from Upper Bena LLG and the women’s representative selected 
from the Lower Bena LLG. The council president and the DA of the Ungai-Bena district 
have confirmed that the MP consults with them when necessary.  They mentioned that 
                                                          
251
 See Administrative Guidelines on the use of DSIP and LLSIP Section 7.1. 
252
 The DA for Ungai-Bena was interviewed on 07th January 2016 in Goroka Eastern Highland Province. 
253
 At the time of interview. 
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whom he may choose is his prerogative, but that he makes sure that he chooses within the 
above mentioned criteria
254
. 
      Membership of the JDPBPC of Daulo also consists of the MP as the chairman and 
Council Presidents as permanent members. As for the three appointed members, they are 
chosen from within the three LLGs of Daulo. The council presidents of Daulo have stated 
that they have never been consulted in respect to the selection of the three appointed 
members
255
. Council President for Lower Asaro, who has been Council President for three 
consecutive terms has stressed that he was never consulted by any of the MPs for the 
selection of these members. However, he said that “the MP by law has the right to choose 
whoever he wants, at the end of the day even with or without consulting with me whoever 
he chooses would still be his choice.”256 
            It is not surprising that the MP’s as chairman of the committee choses the three 
members of the JDPBPC because that is what the OLPGLLG stipulates. This study argues 
that cronyism and nepotism can easily come about because of this. MP’s have so much 
power now that they control the JDPBPC. This possibility is available to the MPs of both 
districts and also the members of JDPBPC for both districts. So why is one district better 
off than the other? The OLPGLLG by creating the JDPBPC with stipulations on its 
membership and budgetary controls have allowed for the development of the districts to be 
at the mercy of the MPs themselves. If the MP wants, he can have a very effective 
JDPBPC and boost service delivery or he can have a weak, corrupt JDPBPC which will 
result in the deterioration of the districts. 
 
                                                          
254
 Councilors and Council Presidents of Ungai-Bena were interviewed on 07
th
 January 2016 in Goroka. 
255
 Councilors and Council Presidents of and District staff of Daulo were interviewed on January 2016 in 
various places in Goroka town and Daulo district. 
256
 Council President Sina, interviewed on January 6 in Goroka town Eastern Highlands Province. 
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6.6 Ongoing Projects 
        Most of the projects in the districts are approved and funded by the JDPBPC using the 
grants from the national government. Those that are not funded directly by the JDPBPC 
are funded by churches or NGOs, it is up to the government whether to support those 
projects or not. As for districts like Ungai-Bena they also take it upon themselves to sought 
funds from other organizations’ and the central government as well. 
        According to the DA and district staff, the Ungai-Bena District used to have a 5 year 
district plan but in 2013 they decided to go for a ten year district plan (2013-2022) which 
was reviewed at the end of 2016. According to regulation these plans, meeting minutes, 
budgets and resolutions are submitted to the Department of Implementation and Rural 
Development (DIRD). Community leaders, council presidents, ward councilors are 
consulted on what priority project is needed and what developmental ideas they have, these 
are than formulated into a ten year plan
257
.In line with their 10 year plan there is currently a 
lot of projects going on, both short term and long term projects. According to the DA the
 
Figure 9 Ungai-Bena new district office under construction (Source: Author) 
                                                          
257
 The district staff and Councilors and Council Presidents of Ungai-Bena were interviewed on 07
th
 January 
2016 in Goroka. 
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Priority project number one is the establishment of the new district headquarters, currently 
12 new staff housing and a new district office complex is under construction, this will be 
followed by another office complex for police, bank, post office and 15 more staff houses. 
 
 
Figure 10 Ungai-Bena's new staff housing project (Source: Author) 
       The second big project is the setup of their 3 local level governments (LLG) offices. 
Office complexes for LLG staff are being built in Upper Bena, Lower Bena and Ungai 
respectively. The council chamber for LLG is also being set up in Ungai, along with 3 
houses and a rural lock up. The construction of Ungai High School is also another priority 
project that is underway. Apart from that they are also refurbishing the Rintebe High 
School and Yabiufa rural Health Centre and water supply projects for each community. 
They also have partnership programs, for example 3000 roofing irons were given to local 
churches for maintenance purposes, and since it’s a partnership program the church came 
up with the rest. 
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        Since Ungai-Bena also produces a lot of coffee, the district government has entered 
into a partnership with the Goroka based Coffee Industry Cooperation (CIC) to help their 
local coffee farmers. They also established a Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) to 
support small businesses in their district. According to the DA, funds will be put through 
the National Development Bank (NDB) so people intending to do small business can get 
loans there. Furthermore, they have a disabled-desk in their district HQ, to attend to the 
grievances of those that are physically challenged; they have a sport desk to support local 
athletes. During the last PNG games 8 athletes from Ungai-Bena who were part of the 
Eastern Highlands team won gold medals, as a reward they were given K1000 each, as part 
of the district government aims of encouraging eligible locals to take part in sports. The 
district government also support NGOs, recently they bought a car for the Goroka based 
NGO, Family Voice , making it easier for Family Voice staff to assist locals when there is 
problems. 
Bena is known for tribal fighting, according to the DA they have tried at first to end the 
tribal fighting but it proved futile, they then involved local churches and formed a peace 
council to mediate between the two warring tribes. It proved successful, for five years now 
Bena has enjoyed relative peace
258
. Whenever there is tension, the peace council steps in 
and calms the situation down. There is a set process in place, they are with the people, 
serving the people and their organization is intact. 
         Daulo, according to a district staff, did not submit its 5 year plan to the Department 
of Implementation and Rural Development for the last parliamentary term when the 
Parliament was dissolved on 22
nd
 April 2017 in preparation for the 2017 National 
Election
259 . Daulo district’s main project for the last parliamentary term was the 
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 Ibid. 
259
 Councilors and Council Presidents of and District staff of Daulo were interviewed on January 2016 in 
various places in Goroka town and Daulo district 
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construction of the Daulo High School, which was finally completed in 2016 after 20 
years.
260
 
 
 
Figure 11 Daulo High School (Steven Mutuzo, Facebook Account, posted on February 18th 2016) 
 
The other big scale project, the Rural electrification program, aimed at providing 
electricity to the villages in Daulo, is still incomplete. Another project is the building of a 
classroom in Yameufa primary school, which was also recently opened couple of weeks 
before the issuing of writs for the 2017 elections
261
. These are the main projects in Daulo. 
When questioned about the few number of ongoing projects, the project officer maintained 
that projects are done according to funds available.
262
 
       The ward councilors of Daulo have complained they do not always get a response 
from the district when they submit their project proposals to the JDPBPC, and on 
occasions that they do it is usually half or a quarter of what they requested for. For 
example, the ward 3 councilor for lower Asaro, submitted a proposal for water supply 
project for K20, 000 to the JDPBPC but received only K5, 000 almost a year later.  He said 
this causes hold up of a lot of projects
263
. 
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        Compared to Ungai-Bena, there is very few projects in Daulo at the moment, and as 
the outlook of Daulo shows, development funds are not used for development.  The 
problem with Daulo district is the undesirable use of the districts funds and they do not 
source outside funds (other than government grants). 
Many of the Daulo people complained about the “claim system” in Daulo district 
and blame it for the lack of development in the district. People of Daulo are known for 
submitting claims whether false or genuine to the district office. Mostly they are damage 
claims, they claim for compensation for injuries sustained during election, food cooked for 
the sitting MP during his campaign trip to their village, cars used, land compensation so on 
and so forth. Basically the claim is for anything and everything, one common thing is that 
it is in relation to the sitting MP or ongoing projects. These claims are submitted to the 
JDPBPC and when approved the DA is responsible for paying. When this interview was 
conducted the DA of Daulo 
 
Figure 12 Daulo people waiting outside the Diwai lodge to collect their claims cheque, which is being paid by 
the DA and other district staff.  
(Source: Author) 
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 (December 8
th
 2015- January 3
rd
 2017) and other staff of the district were at Diwai lodge 
in North Goroka paying out claims. During that time the district headquarters were closed 
even though it was a normal working period (except from December 31
st
 –Jan 3rd).  This 
“claims” system benefits few people at the expense of the majority.  Much of the districts 
funds are diverted to address this issue and focus is not on development. Although some 
people of Daulo do not like this practice, it seems many people do it. They feel that, if 
other can submit a claim and get money, they can too, as, after all, its “public” money.264 
The “claim practice” is still continuing because successive MPs have failed to put a 
stop to it. MPs continue to do it as part of their fulfilling their Big-man obligations, in the 
hope of securing votes, and people favor individual benefits over projects that can benefit 
the districts as a whole. 
       Another unnecessary expense is from the practice that JDPBPC members often meet 
outside of the district to pass the budget, usually in a hotel or lodge. For this trip, they use 
hire cars. They remain in the hotel until the budget is passed. All board and lodging 
expenses are covered by the district. For example, in 2013, they were in the Jubilee Lodge 
at NSI, West Goroka, for three weeks or more. It is a very expensive practice and costs the 
district unnecessary expenditures. If they have stayed at the district headquarters, that 
money could have been saved and used on building a new classroom or health Centre 
instead or seal 5km of road. 
6.7 Causes for Different Performances in Two Districts 
The reason for the difference in both districts is the capacity the district has to bring 
money from outside and not relying only on the government grants alone.  Furthermore, 
Ungai-Bena’s partnership approach has made them able to do more projects with the funds 
because the cost is shared among all stakeholders and they are actually using the money for 
                                                          
264
 Based on interviews conducted among the Daulo residents on December 2015. 
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constructing projects. Frankly put the difference in development in each districts depends 
on their (MPs) status and ability to draw ‘other funds’ apart from the usual grants and their 
‘know how’ in managing those funds. 
     According to Bernard Noibano a consultant with the Department of Planning and 
Monitoring, when it comes to sourcing outside funds Ungai-Bena is at the advantage 
because their MP is a senior state minister. By having connections at the high level he can 
easily source funds for the districts unlike Daulo district whose MPs are mostly back 
benchers and first timers
265
. For instance, grants such as the Complementary grants are 
given upon request by the districts, so in that case the minister with his connections will 
Table 2 Results of Ungai-Bena Open Electorate (PNG Electoral Commission, 2017 
General Election results, Ungai-Bena Open) 
Election Years Winners(MPs) Back at the Time of Election 
1968-1972 Sabumei Kofikai  
1972-1977 Sabumei Kofikai  
1977-1982 Akepa Miakwe  
1982-1987 Malo Kiniafa  
1987-1992 Benais Sabumei  
1992-1997 Kevin Masive  
1997-2002 Damson Lafana  
2002-2007 Benny Allan Manager of Negiso Investment 
2007-2012 Benny Allan Minister for Environment and 
Conservation 
2012-2017 Benny Allan Minister for Lands and Physical 
Planning 
2017-Present Benny Allan Minister for Lands and Physical 
Planning 
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 Bernard Noibano, verbal interview by Facebook call on November 2017.  
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have more chance than the first time, back bencher to get this proposal approved. 
Ungai-Bena is a well-organized district and it is reflecting in the outlook of the 
district. Although the MP most of the time is caught up in his ministerial duties as a state 
has entrusted the running of the district to the DA who is doing a good job. As a matter of 
fact, that is how the OLPGLLG stipulates for district and LLGs to function. MPs should 
only serve as policy makers and not implementers. The only set back is that the JDPBPC 
meetings are held on ad hoc basis depending on the MPs availability. But they make sure 
they have four or more meetings annually as stipulated in the OLPGLLG. Ungai-Bena case 
is a success story, and people have credited the MP as a man of vision an honest and 
religious man, humble and charismatic
266
, MP Benny Allan has even has district treasury 
staff investigated and replaced for colluding with contractors and making payment without 
the DA’s knowledge267, a rare thing to see in the districts of  PNG.  Therefore his winning 
the elections for 4 consecutive terms should not be attributed to his ministerial position at 
the center that enabled him to have more access to the fund from outside, as he has gained 
so much respect from his behavior and attitude to the people of his District.  However, we 
cannot ignore this kind of advantage from the ministerial position for him to be 
continuously elected by his people. 
Daulo on the other hand is way behind. For example, its headquarter is located 
beside the main highway and people passing by have complained that it is an eye sore and 
it just reflects the leadership in Daulo over the past three decades
268
. 
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performance of MPs and district staff. 
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 See www.looping.com/content/district-tresurers-are-most-corrupt-public-servants-claims-mp.  
268
 Based on interviews conducted on December 2015  in Goroka to gauge views of people on the 
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Figure 13Daulo districts head quarter in Asaro            Figure 14 Daulo district head quarter in Asaro 
 
The Ungai-Bena case implies that if managed and used wisely the DSIP grants can 
bring development to the districts.  JDPBPC can be effective if the MP as the chairman is 
adamant on improving the state of the district, Furthermore, to be organized and be able to 
know that funds apart from DSIP can be sought and that there are other avenues to utilize 
to develop the district shows that Ungai-Bena district staff have the capacity and skills to 
manage the district and they are well informed. This is reflected in the outlook of the 
district itself. 
       Daulo district shows total disconnection among all the LLG representatives, JDPBPC 
members and district staff.  Adding on Daulo district indicates that the staff and the 
JDPBPC do not have the capacity or skills to manage the funds coming in or to utilize 
other sources, and the district staffs well as the LLG representatives are incapacitated as so 
much power is at the hands of the MP and the JDPBPC.  Consequently, Daulo have been 
starved of basic government services under successive government which is reflected in 
the outlook of the district, and for the projects that are going on is clan based and is at a 
snail’s pace. 
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       Apart from the difference found between the two districts, this study also finds that the 
LLG are incapacitated. By law all powers and control is at the District level. LLGs do not 
have their own office, no staff, no control over their funds (LLGSIP) and finances. The DA 
who is the CEO of the LLG is in control of the LLGSIP, submissions are made to him and 
he/she decides to approve or not. Many councilors in Daulo district have complained that 
they do not get response from the districts regarding their proposal hence they try to seek 
out the MP himself. They expressed that they do not trust the system at all.
269
 They feel 
that the MP is in control of everything, since he appoints the majority of the members in 
the JDPBPC in which he is the chairman, and also the DA is appointed by the PA with the 
MPs consultation.
270
 Hence, when the communication and relationship between the LLG 
representatives and the DA and MP is bad, the LLG suffers, as is reflected in the two 
districts understudy. As a consequence of this structure of the LLG, people want their own 
clan’s man to be the MP so they can benefit also, this structure in the LLG also shapes the 
voting style of PNG and creates an avenue for the Big-man culture to flourish. In the sense 
that people vote along clan lines or somebody they have a connection with, so that when 
that person become an MP and is able to access government resources he can distribute to 
them. 
       The OLPGLLG provisions and other relevant law such as the Local Level 
Government Act and the Public Service Management Act put so much power at the hands 
of the MPs. Therefore, under the current structure weather a district can benefit from some 
form of service delivery or not depends entirely on the MPs willingness to engage or not. 
Hence the problems faced at the district level are not only confided to cultural factors but 
on the institutions in place as well. This is because cultures, especially the Big-man culture 
have continued to the modern era because it is embodied in the institutions in place; a clear 
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example is the local government system which this study is pointing out. Laws as the ones 
citied above are created to secure the power of the local MPs, which is reflected in the so 
called one man government PNG has, in which all power is concentrated at the district in 
which the MP is representing and not at the LLG. 
Under the current structure, in PNG decentralization can increases corruption at the 
local level and jeopardize equity among different localities. The 1995 OLPGLLG creates 
an avenue for that to materialize. The OLPGLLG needs to be reviewed in regards to this 
and tighter laws and proper guidelines need to be in place to manage the district fund. 
Furthermore as indicated by Daulo district, there is a need for capacity and skills training 
for district staffs, to properly manage large amount of money coming into the district in the 
form of government grants and the affairs of the districts.  
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
     This study is to see how the Papua New Guinea’s politicians reformed its post-
independence political system to accommodate its political culture of Big Men, and what 
effects are brought to the lives and societies of the people as a result of the reform.  This 
research has found a very unique political system that invokes a new dynamism to the 
political culture familiar to the local people. 
 
7.1 1995 Reform 
       Just like many other newly independent countries, Papua New Guinea had wanted to 
become independent as a unitary state.  The Constituent Assembly Members at that time 
were arguing that the provincial government was too costly and that the roles of the 
politicians assembled at the Port Moresby as the people’s representatives would be at 
stake.
271
 The latter’s reasoning is unique in the political culture of Papua New Guinea.  
Due to the lack of any stratified political relationship, politicians assembled at Port 
Moresby for the national affairs have a legitimate fear that their focusing on the national 
affairs and the consequent absence from the local politics may prohibit their re-election as 
the Members of Parliament due to the Big-Man culture which requires physical presence of 
the Big Men before the constituents along with the delivery of services and the connection 
with the people for bringing their votes. Therefore if the Provincial Government was to be 
established and if the local affairs at both the provincial and district levels are decided at 
the provincial government by separate members from the MPs, politicians assembled at 
Port Moresby would lose their appearance at the district level and there would be a chance 
of them losing votes in the next election for the candidates from the Districts in Provincial 
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Assembly.  Thus the politicians assembled at Port Moresby to make the Constitution were 
against the provincial government system at the first instance. 
However, in order to deal with the secessionist claims from Bougainville people raised 
just on the eve of independence, politicians assembled in Port Moresby had to make a 
decision to decentralize the government system.  The resultant Organic Law on Provincial 
Government of 1977 created a dual power structure at the district level with MPs and 
Members of Provincial Assemblies elected from the same Districts as potential rivals for 
the status of Big Men at the Districts.  This situation of rivalry between MPs and MPAs 
was caused by the real political and financial power vested on the Provincial Government 
vis-à-vis the provincially elected MP.   While the MP from an Open Electorate (that is the 
District) had an Electoral Fund to distribute at the District, highly autonomous and 
financially independent Provincial Government could also exert a lot influence for the 
development of the Districts so that MPAs from the same District who participated in the 
decisions at the Provincial Assembly with voting rights could also claim certain roles for 
the District development.  Therefore, MPs soon learned that the highly decentralized 
Provincial Government System was a threat to their status within the Districts as Big Men 
and embarked on the project to reform the system. 
           The reform introduced in 1995 as the Organic Law on Provincial and Local-level 
Governments was, while establishing the lower level governments for more 
decentralization as justification for the reform, claiming that basic government services 
were just not reaching the people especially in the rural areas, primarily to keep, but take 
the teeth out of, the Provincial Government.   The reform abolished the separate 
representatives for the Provincial Assembly and, instead, placed MPs as full members for 
the Provincial Assembly with voting right, thus eliminating the “rivals” for MPs at their 
District politics. This abolishment of MPLs consequently eliminated the Provincial 
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Premier system, too, and created another MP to be elected from the Provincial Electorate, 
who replaces the Provincial Premier to lead the Provincial Government as Provincial 
Governor.  Different from the Provincial Premier, was elected from among the MPLs and, 
therefore, who was a real ruler of autonomous local government with effective political 
and financial power, a newly created Provincial Governor is also a MP and, thus, is just a 
colleague of other MPs who are now the voting members of the Provincial Assembly.  
Furthermore, the budgetary power of the Provincial Government and the Governor to 
control the financial and budgetary power of the Provincial Government was also restricted 
through the creation of the JPPBPC, in which the MPs from Open Electorates within the 
Province are the members. 
On the other, Open Electorate MPs are now in full control over the District budget by 
creating JDPBPC, in which an MP from the Open Electorate that covers the same area as 
the District stipulated in the Constitution monopolizes the budgetary power over the 
District. As to the public power is concerned, Open Electorate MPs have now no rivals 
either at the District or Provincial level.  
7.2 Incapacitated LLGs 
The reform of the Provincial Government in 1995 introduced another government body 
to function below the Provincial Level. The District were to be divided and new 
governments, Local-level Governments, were added in all over the country. on the premise 
that it would bring the government closer to the people than before by maintaining a good 
interface to the public. 
      The uniqueness of the reform is found in the structure of the local government system.  
The reform did not create any government at the District Level and, instead, established 
governments below the District.  By creating a vacuum at this level the OLPGLLG (1995) 
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created the space for the MP to function as a Big-man with all the resources of the District 
at his disposal. The OLPGLLG (1995) allows the MP to function as a single person 
government, hence the position of the MP impacts so much on the faith of the district. This 
was the result desired by the politicians at the center when they pushed for the reform 
Almost 22 years after the reform and most of PNGs districts are still in a deplorable 
state, if the reform was to enhance basic government services than it is not achieving this 
aim at all. 
        However, in reality all the powers of the LLG are vested in the districts in which the 
MPs are representing in the National Parliament. The LLGs representatives do not have 
any control over the LLG affairs. The DA is the person responsible for making 
administrative and financial decisions for the LLG along with the  
This structure has left the LLGs incapacitated. The development grants that is given 
by the central government for the LLG the Local Level Government Support Improvement 
Program (LLGSIP) is managed by the DA. According to the PSIP,DSIP and LLGSIP 
Administrative Guidelines published by the Department of Implementation and Rural 
Development, any proposal that ranges from K5,000 to K500,000 is approved by the DA
272
. 
K500,000 is the amount paid to LLGs under the LLGSIP so that means the DA is in charge 
of all the LLGSIP grants. The same amount of DSIP grants also is approved by the DA
273
.  
By having the administrative and financial powers controlled at the district level the LLG 
representatives have expressed that they feel incapacitated.  The ward councilors of Daulo 
district have expressed that since they hardly get response from proposal they submit to the 
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 See Section 7.1.1 PSIP,DSIP and LLGSIP Administrative Guidelines(2013), Department of 
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 Ibid Section 7.1.2. 
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JDPBPC, they do not have trust in the system. They sometimes try to sought out the MP 
himself or the MPs relative to get their voices across
274
. 
The reason why they sought out the MP directly is because the structure is such that 
MP is seen as the most powerful figure in the District. According to the Public Service 
Management Act (2014), the DA is appointed by the PA in consultation with the MP
275
. So 
just like the appointment of the members of the JDPBPC, DA is seen as a servant of the 
MP in the sense that he carries out wishes of the MP to retain MPs favor. This structure has 
also impacted upon the voting style in PNG in which people try to vote their own ‘Big-man’ 
into the government to be able to access the resources. In that way emphasis is put on 
personnel relationship with the MP and clan affiliations, so when he gets into power it is 
easier to connect with them, which consequently creates an avenue for Big-man culture to 
thrive. The MP (Big-man) than hands out resources to keep his support and followers. 
Furthermore this study finds that DSIP itself is not the problem, in fact massive 
funding to the local government, if used wisely can be a very effective tool of bringing 
services to the rural arears, as exemplified by the Ungai-Bena District of Eastern Highlands 
Province and the Bulolo-Wau District of Morobe Province, however the OLPGLLG 
stipulations on how these funds are to be used and the success per say of districts in PNG 
now depends on the MPs personality and the ability of each district to source outside funds 
apart from the DSIP, it is up to them weather they want to develop the districts or not, as 
illustrated by Ungai-Bena and Wau-Bulolo, the MPs for both of this districts are focused 
on service delivery hence we can see outcomes. As the case study on chapter six has 
indicated, the difference in the development of the districts depends on funds available and 
funds sought at district own behalf, and more importantly how these funds are distributed 
to implement. 
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The new provincial government was created to secure the position and powers of the 
national MPs. However, even with this system national politicians are not secured, they are 
still vulnerable to harsh competition. Their political security is not secured, majority of 
them do not return after elections. Suffice to say the competition remained harsh. Unless 
they bring more funds, they are the most vulnerable people to be replaced. 
One reason for this harsh competition can be attributed to the Limited Preferential 
Voting (LPV) system PNG has. The electoral system was reformed in 2002 and used in the 
2007 General election. As explained by the Commonwealth-Pacific Island Forum Election 
Assessment team; 
 
The decision to move away from the first-past-the-post voting to LPV system prior 
to the 2007 election was a response to growing calls to better reflect the will of the 
majority of voters and increase the mandate of MPs….The first-past-the-post 
system had the effect that the candidates campaigned only in their limited local 
areas relying on clansmen vote to secure the percentage of votes needed to win. 
Preferential voting would require candidates to seek support (in form of 
preference) outside their own clans an communities, while ensuring that elected 
MPs held a majority mandate from the people of their electorate.
276
 
 
The LPV gives rise to the competition among contestants and any contestant has a 
chance of winning. This system has also made it mandatory for MPs to have a fair 
attitude in distributing resources throughout the district. This is because MP/candidates 
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no longer rely on their “base vote” but they need pick up (preference) vote from other 
parts of the districts to secure a win. 
Therefore, while the powers of the MPs were secured after the 1995 reform, their 
survival as an MP was not secured and they are subjected to harsh competition. How 
the political system was kept balanced can be seen by doing further research on the 
Election System and its impact on Politics in PNG. The Election System will be the 
future research task. 
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Appendices 
 
Table 1.1 Daulo District Ward Councilors Response 
Daulo district has three LLGs, which are Watabaung LLG with six wards, Upper Asaro 
LLG with eight wards and Lower Asaro with nine wards. Each LLG which is a total of 
twenty three wards. Twelve out of the twenty-three councilors were interviewed. The main 
aim of the questions was to find out how effective the LLG is. Questions about the 
relationship between the ward councilors and the MP and district staff and their president 
is important because under the new 1995 OLPGLLG and through the JDPBPC the MPs 
yields more power in the district affairs. Does this have any impact on the ward councilor’s 
role in their districts?  
Questions Respondents (Ward 
Councilors) 
Response 
1) How often does the LLG 
Assembly meet annually? 
 
All twelve councilors 3 times 
2) How do you gauge 
people`s opinions on what 
their locality lacks and is 
in need of? 
 
 
 
8 councilors  Self-observation, chatting 
with villagers 
4 councilors Through Ward Development 
Committee meetings, this is 
attended by Village 
representatives. 
3) How do you convey those 
grievances or needs to the 
district HQ or how do you 
bring awareness to your 
peoples grievances or 
needs? 
 
All twelve councilors Grievances are tabled at the 
LLG Assembly Meetings 
and the President is 
supposed to present it to the 
JDP&BPC 
8 Councilors Because of lack of response 
from the HQ, we are unsure 
if our grievances are tabled 
in the JDP&BPC at all, 
sometimes we try to talk to 
the MP himself, or his 
relatives, or the District 
Staff. We don’t trust the 
system. 
4) Is the response from the 
district HQ to you and 
your people’s 
satisfaction? 
 
7 councilors  No response 
4 councilors No “proper” response: e.g. 
Not in line with request. 
Less money and wrong 
projects 
5) Is your job as the ward 
councilor full time or part 
time? If it’s part-time 
All Councilors Part time in the sense that we 
are not required to be at any 
office full time and have free 
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what other job do you do 
to support your family? 
time to do our own staff. But 
we carry the title every day 
and are supposed to be 
present whenever needed. 
No other formal jobs. 
6) Is your salary from being 
a ward councilor enough 
to sustain you and your 
family? 
All councilors  No, they are never paid on 
time
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4 councilors Because of lack of payments 
they are tempted to misuse 
project funds, to take care of 
their family as being a 
councilor is their only 
reliable source of income 
7) Do you have an office or 
work station in your ward 
or the HQ? 
All Councilors  NO 
8) How many projects are 
going on in your ward? 
10 Councilors  None 
2 Councilor New classroom(Ward 2 
Lower Asaro) 
Daulo High school( Ward 4 
Upper Asaro) 
 
9) Where you endorsed by a 
political party to contest 
the seat or do you have 
any party affiliations? If 
so is it the same party 
with the MP? 
All Councilors NO 
10) Your term is almost up, 
how may projects where 
you able to deliver to 
your people during your 
term? 
9 Councilors  None 
3 Councilors Personally none but there are 
1 or 2 projects in their ward 
which was done by the MP 
and DA without their 
consultation 
Table 1.2 Daulo District LLG Presidents Response. Two out of three presidents were 
successfully interviewed. 
QUESTIONS Respondents (LLG 
Presidents) 
Response 
1) Have you ever been 
consulted by the MP 
before the other 
JDP&BPC are chose? If 
not did you remind your 
MP to do so? 
 
 
Watabung LLG President No, never consulted. 
Lower Asaro President No, never consulted but the 
law says MP can chose 
whoever he wants, so 
weather he consults with me 
or not the choice will still be 
his. 
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2) The 1995 OLP&LLG 
does not specify the 
requirements of the 3 
members to be appointed 
by the MP, however, does 
the district have any 
criteria or requirements 
for those members to be 
selected?  
 
Watabung LLG President No, not to my knowledge 
Lower Asaro LLG 
President 
No, I have not seen or heard 
of any if there is 
3) How often does the 
JDPBPC meet annually? 
 
Both Presidents 4 times 
4) What is usually discussed 
in the JDPBPC meetings? 
 
Both Presidents Basically Budgetary Matters 
and prioritizing of projects 
5) What methods and 
criteria’s are used to 
select and priorities 
projects?  
 
Watabung LLG President No, We tell the MP about 
issues that we want to 
address in our LLG, it is up 
to him whether he can 
respond or not. 
Lower Asaro LLG  
President 
No, In my 3 terms as 
president I have not seen one 
MP use criteria for selecting 
projects. 
6) During your tenure, how 
many projects have been 
completed in your ward? 
 
Watabung LLG President With the limited funds that is 
available to me I have done a 
few projects 
Lower Asaro President I have been President for a 
while, so I lost count but I 
have done and completed 
several periods over my term 
7) How often does the LLG 
Assembly meet in one 
year? 
Both Presidents 4 times 
8) Do local ward councilors 
attend 
Both Presidents Yes 
9) What issues are discussed 
during those meetings?  
 
Both Presidents Mainly projects and funding 
proposals by ward councilors 
10) A) Do you table the 
people`s grievance’s at 
JDP&BPC? 
 
Both Presidents YES 
B) During interviews with 
ward councilors they said 
that they never get 
response from the HQ 
Both Presidents We table the grievances in 
the JDP&BPC meetings. 
Weather they (we) get a 
response or not depends on 
 118 
 
about their proposals. The 
also stated that they are 
unsure whether you table 
their grievances in the 
JDPBPC. What do you 
say about that? 
the MP; we do not have a 
say in that. We are the LLG 
mouthpiece if the MP does 
not responds to the ward 
grievance’s we are affected 
to, those are wards under us. 
11) Do you have an office 
(work station) in the 
district HQ or in your 
ward? 
If no, how do you carry 
out your duties? For 
example if a ward 
councilor or a member of 
your ward want to consult 
with you on some issues, 
where do they find you? 
If yes, do you have any 
secretaries or any 
organizational basis to 
serve the people? 
 
Both Presidents No, I don’t. I live in the 
village so ward councilors or 
my people can see me any 
time. If not than we have the 
LLG meetings, I am 
available. 
12) As an LLG President can 
you briefly tell me how a 
normal working day is for 
you? 
 
Both Presidents I do my own stuff privately 
but is the MP wants to see us 
or if the JDP&BPC have 
meetings than we go to the 
HQ, but we do not need to 
go there every day. 
 
 
Table 1.3 Ungai-Bena Ward Councilors Response 
Questions Respondents (Ward 
Councilors) 
Response 
1) How often does the 
LLG Assembly meet 
annually? 
 
All nine councilors 4 times 
2) How do you gauge 
people`s opinions on 
what their locality 
lacks and is in need 
of? 
 
 
All nine councilors Through the Ward 
Development Committee 
Meetings, attended by 
village representatives. And 
we live in the village to so 
that helps in us assessing the 
situations on the ground 
3) How do you convey 
those grievances or 
needs to the district 
All nine  Through LLG Assembly 
meetings and our president 
is our (formally) mouth 
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HQ or how do you 
bring awareness to 
your peoples 
grievances or needs? 
 
piece at the JDP&BPC 
5 out of the nine councilors (unofficially) We can do it 
by ourselves too, directly to 
the MP or District staff 
because we communicate 
regularly 
4) Is the response from 
the district HQ to you 
and your people’s 
satisfaction? 
 
All nine Yes, we get prompt 
response, and if the answer 
is no or wait they explain 
why, but because we already 
have 5 year plans, we work 
to follow that, anything 
outside or if there is 
emergency its brought to the 
MP and district staff as soon 
as possible 
5) Is your job as the 
ward councilor full 
time or part time? If 
it’s part-time what 
other job do you do to 
support your family? 
All nine Part time because I am not 
in the office every day and I 
do other things too 
6) Is your salary from 
being a ward 
councilor enough to 
sustain you and your 
family? 
All nine No, it is not enough. But 
have other means of sustain 
family  
7) Do you have an office 
or work station in 
your ward or the HQ? 
All nine Not individually, but Ward 
Councilors  have an office 
here at the HQ and currently 
our LLG offices are being 
constructed in our LLGs. 
8) How many projects 
are going on in your 
ward? 
All nine Yes, a total of 14 projects 
are going on in nine wards 
10 small scale and 4 big 
projects(like the Ungai high 
school and construction of 
the new HQ offices) 
9) Where you endorsed 
by a political party to 
contest the seat or do 
you have any party 
affiliations? If so is it 
the same party with 
the MP? 
All nine No 
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10) Your term is almost 
up, how may projects 
where you able to 
deliver to your people 
during your term? 
All nine  A few those with the 5 year 
plan and other projects that 
we start outside of the plan, 
like building a church, 
building of toilets the 
JDPBPC help fund us to 
complete those projects. 
 
Figure 1.4 Ungai-Bena District, Upper Bena LLG President Response 
Questions Respondent(LLG President) 
1) Have you ever been 
consulted by the MP 
before the other 
JDP&BPC are chose? If 
not did you remind your 
MP 
No, but, the MP chose a Church Representative, 
Community Representative and a Women’s 
Representative. Who he chooses is up to him. 
2) The 1995 OLP&LLG 
does not specify the 
requirements of the 3 
members to be 
appointed by the MP, 
however, does the 
district have any criteria 
or requirements for 
those members to be 
selected?  
 
No, refer to the above 
3) How often does the 
JDPBPC meet annually? 
 
4 or 3 or 2 depends on the availability of our MP 
because he is a Minister and we have to move our 
schedule around to cater for that. 
4) What is usually 
discussed in the 
JDPBPC meetings? 
 
Mostly Budgetary matters and projects 
5) What methods and 
criteria’s are used to 
select and priorities 
projects?  
 
From our WDC and LLG Assembly meetings the 
JDP&BPC makes decision on the urgency of the project 
to priorities, than we have the big projects which we also 
decide depending on the long term benefits it will have 
for the district 
6) During your tenure, how 
many projects have 
been completed in your 
ward? 
 
A few small projects and a major one is going on which 
is the construction of the new District Headquarters. 
7) How often does the 
LLG Assembly meet in 
one year? 
4 times 
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8) Do local ward 
councilors attend 
Yes, they have to 
9) What issues are 
discussed during those 
meetings?  
 
Mainly projects, and check up on whether they are going 
as planned 
10) Do you table the 
people`s grievance’s at 
JDP&BPC? 
 
Yes 
11) Do you have an office 
(work station) in the 
district HQ or in your 
ward? 
If no, how do you carry out 
your duties? For example if 
a ward councilor or a 
member of your ward want 
to consult with you on some 
issues, where do they find 
you? If yes, do you have 
any secretaries or any 
organizational basis to serve 
the people? 
 
Not individually, but we the Presidents have an office at 
the HQ, I don’t personally have secretaries, I’m a village 
man, I stay with the people in the village so if they need 
anything they can just talk to me. 
12) As an LLG President 
can you briefly tell me 
how a normal working 
day is for you? 
 
I don’t go to the district HQ every day; I am not obliged 
to do that.  
 
Table 1.5 Ungai-Bena District Administrator Response 
Questions Response 
Q1) According to the OLPLLG Section 
33A (4) as the DA, you are the CEO of the 
JDPBPC. How does that define your role 
within the JDPBPC? As the CEO are you 
also a member of the JDPBPC? If so what 
is the legal or other basis of your 
membership?  
 
Although, I am a member I do not have the 
power like the other members. I am an ex-
officio member only providing technical 
advice. I do not have voting, I do not make 
any decision there, just providing advice. I 
report to the PA and the JDP&BPC, any 
matters discussed in the committee are passed 
by the committee members. The DT is also 
an ex-officio member like me, providing 
financial advice. 
Q2) Although the OLPLLG clearly allows 
the MP to select 3 members other than the 
LLG heads, do you and the LLG President 
also have a say on who the MP choses?  If 
not are there any others who have 
For the appointment of the members it is the 
prerogative of the Chairman (MP), he 
appoints who sits on the board, we have a 
representative of each LLG in the committee, 
and one has to be a female. 
 122 
 
influence on the MP to choose in this 
regard? Do you think the LLG President is 
properly consulted? 
Q3) The OLPLLG does not specify the 
requirements of the 3 members to be 
appointed by the MP, did your district set 
any criteria or requirements for those 
members when being selected? 
None, but like what he (MP) did he have a 
church representative, a women’s 
representative and a community 
representative, so that the criteria he used to 
select, community, church and women’s 
representatives. 
Q4) How often does the JDPBPC meet in 
one year? 
 
 
We actually do not have a schedule, like right 
now, but when there is a need to call a 
meeting than we do and we attend the 
meeting, actually the MP is a state minister 
too, so sometimes the meeting is not held as 
schedule because MP has to attend to 
ministry matters. Last year (2015) we had 
three. Meetings are important to approve 
budgets and pass resolution to implement it, 
so we do have meetings yearly but not as 
planned, it depends on the availability of the 
MP. 
Q5) What subjects are discussed in the 
meetings and are the proceedings or 
minutes of the meetings published? If not, 
why? 
 
Yes we do, Discussions on the meetings are 
especially on projects, proposals to submit to 
National government for funding, all impact 
projects, others are partnership programs, we 
are working with churches, we are working 
with communities, rural programs, churches 
for peace mediations programs, partnerships 
with schools, basically it’s about projects and 
awareness to conduct if there is any such as 
peace awareness, HIV/Aids awareness and so 
on. We also support SME’s and we got in a 
partnership with the CIC to help our coffee 
growers. So those kinds of stuff are 
discussed.  
Q6) A) Does the JDPBC publish annual 
budgets plans? 
   If no? Why? 
 
B) So is it possible for public to access 
them? 
A) yes we have, JDPBC makes budget plans, 
publicity is through meeting minutes and our 
budget plans and then the meeting minutes 
and budget plans are then submitted to the 
office of rural development and finance goes 
to the PA’s office, so there is budget and 
meeting meetings, they go together. 
B) Yes, its public document you can access 
them. If you need we can make available to 
you. 
 
 
Q7) Recently some districts such as we used to have the 5year district plans but in 
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Goilala-Tapini launched their 5 year 
development Plan
278
. Does your district 
also have a 5 year development plan?  
 
If No why? If yes has it been published 
and made accessible to the public?  
2013 we decided to go for a 10 year plan, we 
will review this at the end of this year(2016), 
so we have 2013 to 2022,copies of the plans 
go to the office of rural development(DEC) 
Department of Implementation and rural 
development. All meeting minutes, budgets, 
resolution and development plans all go to 
the DIRD 
 
Q8) How did you produce the plan? Who 
drafted it? Did you have any public 
participation?  
 
 
 
We use to bring in all community leaders, 
presidents, councilors and we meet together 
and what priority projects and , what ideas 
they have about developments, we get those 
ideas and then the district management team 
formulates it into a 10 year plan, when we 
run out of ideas then the people from the 
provincial planning office steps in to assist, 
so there is some sort of consultation to 
develop our districts 10 year development 
plan, some councilor, even LLGs have plans 
so they do the same thing. 
 
Q) 9 Are these plans accessible at the 
DIRD? 
Yes, or you can come to us. 
Q10) Currently, how many projects are 
going on in Ungai-Bena? 
There is a lot, Priority project number 1 
establishment of the new District HQ , we are 
currently building 12 new houses and a new 
office complex, there is another office 
complex coming up for police, bank and post 
office, in front of the new one you saw, there 
are already 12 houses being built current land 
clearing is going on for 15 more new(staff) 
houses, it will be a town, our small town so 
we are working bit by bit to achieve that, we 
need a huge amount of money to complete 
that, the work is slow according to the 
budget,(money coming in).Then the 2
nd
 one 
is our 3 LLG set up, if you go to Upper Bena 
they have an office complex there, same for 
Lower Bena at your former high school, it 
was built with EU counterpart, district, LLG 
and Provincial Government to set up, same 
for Ungai LLG with 3 houses and office 
complex, chamber and rural lock up, ok, 
Ungai high school, that is another impact 
project for us where it will cost us millions to 
establish, we have paid a contractor and its 
currently underway, for classrooms alone it 
                                                          
278
 National Emtv News October 13 
 124 
 
will cost about K8million, 8.5 mill plus, then  
dormitory and mess etc. and we are looking 
at almost K20mill, we will world slowly to 
achieve that. 
Yes it’s a long term project which we started 
this towards the end of last year. We brought 
in an overseas contractor to work on it. 
Similarly our 1
st
 impact project is also an 
overseas contractor.  
we are currently doing Rintebe high school 
going to Sigere up to Yabiufa health center 
up in the mountains, ok water supply, each 
community we are working on water supply, 
on churches, we went into church 
partnership, we gave them 3000 roofing 
irons, ply woods cement bags and since it’s a 
partnership program they came up with the 
rest, coffee cooperatives, we started as little 
west side coffee buyers and now we have a 
coffee cooperate, the profit made from this is 
used to buy iron roofs, pulping machine and 
round up and given to the farmers, those ones 
that sell their coffee to us, and sports we 
assist also, we assist athletes in the PNG 
games, to support athletes in our 
district ,those that got gold medals got K1000 
each, about 8 people got gold medal so we 
gave K8000, then the disables we have 
Ungai-Bena disable desk we have u-b sports 
desk, last year we gave them K100,000 to 
establish themselves, this year we gave 
another K100,000.When we move into our 
new district complex they will have their own 
office space , CIC K200,000 we will have 
partnership so anything to do with coffee, 
you don’t come to us you go to CIC ,SME we 
might put it through National Development 
Bank so they can get loans there. We support 
NGOs too such as Family Voice, we bought a 
10 seater land cruiser for them. So if there is 
any problem in our district, we just call them 
to come. WE have programs for Peace, in 
Bena there is a history of a lot of tribal fight , 
but now if you travel there even at 
12midnight there will be nobody to disturb 
you or hijack you ,after 5 years, it has been 5 
years now without any tribal fights, we tried 
at first by ourselves but it did not work out so 
we involved the churches , so they went and 
worked as an interdenominational peace 
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council, and at the new location of our 
district office you will see the peace 
monument, that is the success story of our 
programmer(peace) we bought a 10 seater for 
them also and they go around, when there is a 
fight and gun shots, we don’t go ,the police 
don’t go the peace council goes and clam the 
situation down then we go in. So for 5 years 
we enjoyed peace in our district, we pump a 
lot of money into this also. For water supply 
projects we are starting now from community 
to community. If you go to Ungai high school 
down to Ketarobo there is no water, now 
there is water from Ketarobo pumped to 
Ungai h/s ,the LLGs are also doing the 
same ,when they come up short we help and 
vice versa in the case for water supply, for 
roads and bridges too 
 
Q11) Ungai-Bena is said to be the only 
district that has been doing well in the past 
10 years in terms of physical outlook. 
What do you think is the reason behind 
this success? 
yes, the key factor here is that we are all 
working as a team, it’s all team work from 
the electoral office to the treasury office to 
the LLG officers ,councilors, presidents then 
to the district administration its one team. 
That’s all I think that’s our determining 
factor behind our success story. Other people 
talk of our success story, but our secret is 
team work, that is all  
 
Q12) How would you describe your 
relationship with the, Council Presidents, 
Ward councilors and the MP? 
Very cordial, evidently you can see, I (phone) 
called our Councilors and council 
President(1)  and 5 mins later they show up 
and the same for our council, if the 
president(council) pick their phones and call 
them they will respond very quickly and 
show up asap if necessary. 
Like I said we work as a team, so there is 
always top cooperation among us  
 
Q13A) Does the local MP have an office 
(work station) in the District headquarters? 
 13B) So whenever he is he, he is present 
in his office? 
 
13C) how do you contact him when he is 
not present in the district and how is his 
response? 
 
13A) He’s in his office right now. He has 3 
offices, one in the town (ministerial work) 
and two here in the district HQ. When he 
comes from time to time he still calls into this 
district office, for example today you can see 
a lot of people outside his office, and he is in 
there addressing them. 
 
13B) yes he’s always present. 
13C) WE have his contacts especially his 
phone number and email and stuff. 
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He is very prompt. Even if you text him he 
will text you back asap. 
But because he has a lot of concern for his 
people, even anybody in the village calls him 
he responds. 
We did set up a phone hotline it’s not up and 
running yet, will probably start this 
year(2016).he has all the district officials 
numbers too so our communication is 
effective. 
 
Q14) Can you briefly tell me how the 
district HQ run the district affairs on a 
daily basis? How many staffs do you 
have? How is the office organized?  
 
 
we are currently understaffed, like there is no 
people for community development, 
education, youth, natural resource have 
twenty staff plus casuals  
Yes, they are present every day, our holiday 
period was last week and we are supposed to 
be on holiday even now but some of us are 
workaholics so we are here making our 
presence felt. I am the senior officer in the 
district and I am responsible for keeping the 
district running and serving out people. 
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Figure 15 Map of Papua New Guinea 
Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/maps/papua_map.jpg - Political map of Papua New Guinea  
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